Policy Analysis with Econometric Models by Christopher A. Sims
CHRISTOPHER  A.  SIMS 
University of Minnesota 
Policy  Analysis  with 
Econometric  Models 
RECENTLY the rational  expectations  school has mounted  an attack  on the 
conventional  use of simultaneous  equations  models for policy analysis. 
One might go further  and say that among academic macroeconomists 
the conventional  methods have not  just been attacked,  they have been 
discredited. The practice of using econometric models to project the 
likely effects of different  policy choices, then choosing the best from 
among  the projected  outcomes, is widely believed to be unjustifiable  or 
even the primary  source of recent problems  of combined  high inflation 
and  low economic activity. Instead, it is claimed,  policy analysis  should 
be  formulated  as choice among  rules  of behavior  for  the  policy  authorities 
and  estimates  should  be made  of the stochastic  properties  of the  economy 
under  each proposed  rule  to choose the best. 
This point of view has gained such wide acceptance in part  because 
of its association  with Lucas's theoretical  demonstration  that a Phillips 
curve  could  emerge  in an  economy in which  such  an association  between 
inflation  and real activity was not a usable menu for policy choice. 
Because users of conventional simultaneous  equations models some- 
times presented  the Phillips  curve as just such a menu, and because it 
became  apparent  in the 1970s  that  this menu  was not helpful,  an analysis 
that  provided  a cogent explanation  for why the menu  was chimerical  had 
great  appeal. 
As  in most revolutions, the old regime toppled by  the rational 
expectations  revolution  was corrupt  and  in some sense deserved  its fate. 
However, as is often the case, the revolution  itself has had  its excesses, 
destroying  or discarding  much  that was valuable  in the name  of utopian 
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ideology.  This paper  tries to assess where the revolution  itself could use 
revision.I 
In this paper  I argue  that it is a mistake  to think  that decisions about 
policy can only be described, or even often be described, as choice 
among  permanent  rules of behavior  for the policy authorities.  A policy 
action  is better  portrayed  as implementation  of a fixed  or slowly changing 
rule. I also argue that explicit identification  of expectation-formation 
mechanisms is not necessary for policy analysis, concluding that the 
rational  expectations critique of econometric policy analysis is a cau- 
tionary footnote to such analysis rather  than a deep objection to its 
foundations.  From  this  perspective,  the conventional  use of econometric 
models  to aid in policy choice is neither  self-contradictory  nor  meaning- 
less. 
Applying Decision Theory to Economic Policymaking 
Formal  quantitative  analysis  of policy choice must  begin  with  a model 
of the effects of policy. The model  must  describe  the "outcome,  " usually 
in  the  form  of a  probability  distribution  over  future  events in  the  economy, 
for each possible "setting of policy." To choose policy optimally, one 
evaluates  the outcomes  according  to some objective  function  and  chooses 
the best. Although this description  appears static, in the sense that it 
refers  to a single decision rather  than  to a time sequence of them, it can 
also be applied  to dynamic  problems.  In the conventional  description  of 
a dynamic  problem  there is at each date, t, a measure,  y,, of the current 
state of the economy (which may include information  on the history of 
the economy and of policy), and a value must be chosen for the policy 
action at t, c,. The model gives  a conditional  distribution for y,  , the 
state of the economy in the next period, as a function  of y, and c,. If the 
objective  function  included  only y,  1,  one would simply  choose c, so as 
1. The senses in which  the "old regime"  was in my view "corrupt"  are discussed  in 
more  detail  in my "Macroeconomics  and  Reality,"  Econometrica,  vol. 48 (January  1980), 
pp. 1-48. There  I argue  that  the  identifying  restrictions  used  to obtain  equation-by-equation 
interpretations  of these models are incredible.  They are mainly  simplifications,  chosen 
empirically  so that  they do not conflict  with  the data.  Such  simplifications  may  be a useful 
part  of estimating  a forecasting  model, but they do not represent  a priori  knowledge  and 
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to obtain  the best probability  distribution  of y,  1.  In general, however, 
the  objective  function  will depend  on  y,,?  (and  perhaps  also c,,?)  at many 
or all dates  beyond t +  1. Then, in order  to set ct  optimally  in the current 
period, one must determine  a set of optimal  contingency plans for all 
future  dates, describing  how each ct,+  will be chosen as a function of 
information  available  at t + s. Defining  the outcome as the conditional 
distribution  of  all  future  yt,  and  ct,+  given  yt,  ct and  the  optimal 
contingency  plans,  the dynamic  problem  becomes analogous  to the static 
problem.  A policy setting is a complete set of contingency  plans  for the 
future  course of policy, and  one chooses among  such settings  to achieve 
the best outcome. 
However, this abstract  description  of the problem  of policy choice 
appears  at first  glance not to match  the problems  policymakers  actually 
face. Decision theory  portrays  optimal  policy choice in  a dynamic  setting 
as a single analytical  exercise. One has to produce contingency plans 
specifying  policy actions  at all  future  dates  under  all  conceivable  circum- 
stances  in order  to find  the best current  policy action. Once  this has been 
done, there should be no need for new analysis at future  dates. Yet in 
practice  macroeconomic  policymaking  does not seem to be this sort of 
once-for-all analysis and decision. Policymakers ordinarily  consider 
what actions to take in the next few quarters  or years, reconsider  their 
plans every few months, and repeatedly use econometric models to 
project the likely effects of alternative  actions. Furthermore,  optimal 
policy should  be a deterministic  function  of information  available  to the 
policymaker,  but actual  policy seems to include  a large  component  that 
is unpredictable  even to observers  with the same information  set as the 
policymaker. 
On closer examination, these difficulties  with decision theory as a 
description  of actual  policy choice are  probably  not important.  It is likely 
that policymakers' objective functions discount the future, so  that 
actions  and  consequences  far  enough  ahead  receive little  weight.  Precise 
contingency  plans for dates far in the future  will therefore  be relatively 
unimportant  in  solving  the  current  problem.  A good  approximate  solution 
will thus concentrate  on determination  of the current  policy action, ct, 
and  the contingency  plans for policy actions in the near  future, but will 
tolerate  cruder  approximations  for contingency  plans  in the increasingly 
distant  future. This is more likely because the state of the economy in 
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contingencies  that would have to be considered  in formulating  precise 
contingency plans for that time period is great. The cost of precise 
analysis  of such wide ranges  of contingencies  is high, while the value of 
such accurate  analysis  of the distant  future  in improving  the choice of c, 
is relatively  low. It is perfectly reasonable,  therefore,  for even a nearly 
optimal  procedure  for choosing policy to involve reconsidering  policy 
plans  at regular  intervals.2 
Policy is not made by a single maximizing  policymaker,  but through 
the political  interaction  of a number  of institutions  and individuals.  The 
people involved in the process, the nature  of the institutions, and the 
views and values of the public  shift over time in imperfectly  predictable 
ways. Thus  even if each individual  who has some power over the choice 
of policy has a coherent view of his or her objectives and of a dynamic 
model of the economy, leading that policymaker to believe in the 
appropriateness  of a particular  value for c, as a function  of the state, the 
actual setting of c, will be partly  random  from the point of view of the 
public. The observed unpredictability  of policy need not, therefore, 
imply  that  any individual  policymaker  is randomizing  his or her actions. 
Rational Expectations 
Control  theory's dynamic  version of the problem  of optimal  decision 
theory  rests on the following  apparently  reasonable  assumptions: 
At each date t there is a list of numbers, the vector describing  the 
state of the economy, y,, which summarizes  all aspects of the history  of 
the system being  controlled  that are relevant  to its future  evolution. 
At each t there  is a function,f, determining  the probability  distribution 
of the next period's state Yt+  1,  from  the current  state, yt, and  the current 
policy action, ct, where f,  is taken as given when policy choice is 
optimized. 
Policy actions, c, (the vector of values for the control  variables  at t in 
2. In textbook  dynamic  control  problems,  the form  of the function  relating  optimal  c, 
to the current  state often tends to be a fixed form over time. If economic policy choice 
were  like  these  textbook  problems,  the  need  for  reanalysis  would  steadily  diminish  through 
time as one refined  the knowledge  of the function  describing  the optimal  choice of c,. 
However, in economics the form of the model relating  the state and policy to the next 
period's  state  inevitably  drifts  in time so that  there  is no reliable  tendency  for c, to become 
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control theory), can depend on information  available  at t, but not on 
information  available  only later  than t. 
In engineering applications the f,  functions and the state of the 
economy and control vectors, y, and c,  are determined  by the physical 
causal  structure  of the system being  controlled.  In economics it is not so 
clear what vector of variables  summarizes  the state of the economy or 
what vector of variables  summarizes  the effects on the economy of all 
policy actions. People  trying  to make  a direct  link  between  econometrics 
and control theory have assumed  that thef, functions  are the equations 
of an econometric  model  and  that  the two vectors, ct  and  yt, are  obtained 
by dividing  the variables  in the econometric  model into two categories, 
policy variables  (those in ct)  and  others. 
The rational expectations critique challenges this way of bringing 
control  theory to bear  on econometric  policy analysis. It points out that 
econometric  models describe the behavior  of people, not an inanimate 
system. People's  current  economic  choices depend  not  only on the  actual 
values of variables  entering  an econometric  model, but on their expec- 
tations about future values of those variables.  For a given setting of ct 
and  Yt,  people may behave differently  according  to what their  views are 
of how cs will be chosen in the future. The critique  argues, therefore, 
that it is a mistake to treat econometric models and the variables  they 
contain  as playing  the roles off,  c, and  y in control theory. There is no 
well-defined  function  determining  the distribution  of yt, 1  from  yt and ct 
alone  if yt  and ct  are simply  a list of variables  drawn  from  an econometric 
model.  The views of the public  about  the future  will always  be an omitted 
argument  when one attempts  to construct  such a function.  In particular, 
the econometric model itself has a form that changes as  people's 
expectations  of the future  change. 
Control  theory teaches us, though, that in choosing c, a policymaker 
will in general  have to form contingency  plans for choices of ct?5 for all 
positive s also. To the extent that the public finds out about these 
contingency  plans for future  policy, its behavior  is likely to be affected 
by them. This leads to the conclusion by rational  expectations  analysts 
that  econometric  models of the type in wide current  use, which  make  no 
provision  for examining  the effects of the public's views about  plans  for 
future  policy choices, are useless for policy analysis. 
Having reached this destructive conclusion, what way out does 
rational  expectations  provide?  One possibility is the use of the rational 
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assumption  (which  is stronger  than  what is needed to  justify the rational 
expectations  critique)  is that  the public  behaves  optimally,  given its own 
objectives  and  the information  available  to it, and  further  that  the public 
understands  precisely what contingency plans have been chosen for 
future policy.  Under this assumption there is  no sharp distinction 
between actions taken now and contingency plans for future action. 
Both are chosen now and both have effects now. Policy analysis under 
this assumption is not a special case of control theory; it becomes a 
special  case of game theory. As in game  theory, what is being chosen is 
a complete set of contingency  plans, a strategy.  Also as in game  theory, 
the other  player  (the public  in this case) is assumed  to understand  one's 
own strategy  and  to play optimally. 
The rational  expectations  critique,  by using  examples  generated  with 
the rational  expectations  assumption,  shows what serious errors  can be 
made in econometric policy analysis if the response of expectation- 
formation  mechanisms  to policy is ignored.  As a warning  about  potential 
pitfalls, the critique  is certainly  correct in principle.  There can be little 
doubt, for example, that the consequences of anticipated  and unantici- 
pated inflation  are different, and that policy analysis using a dynamic 
model which ignores this fact can be seriously misleading. But the 
resolution  of this difficulty  by simply  accepting  the rational  expectations 
assumption  is of mainly  academic  interest  for a number  of reasons. 
In the theory of zero-sum games the assumption  that other players 
know one's own strategy and use this knowledge optimally  leads to a 
solution with appealing  properties, even if we expect that most other 
players will either not understand  our strategy  or use their knowledge 
suboptimally.  The result  of a strategy  chosen on this assumption  will be 
that  other  players  will lose at least as much,  under  incomplete  knowledge 
or suboptimal  play, as they would  if they played  optimally.  If their  losses 
are  our  gain, such a strategy  is then appealingly  conservative;  its results 
can be no worse than what they are calculated  to be. But the losses of 
the public  are not the gains of the economic policymaker-in fact almost 
precisely the opposite. In the problem  of economic policy choice, the 
assumption that the public knows our strategy and reacts optimally 
cannot be justified as in the theory of zero-sum games, that is, as a 
conservative assumption; if it is incorrect, policy chosen on this as- 
sumption  could produce results much worse than expected. The only 
way to justify the assumption  is to claim  that it is a close approximation 
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Macroeconomic  policymakers  cannot  in  fact  guarantee  that  the public 
understands  the policymakers'  choices of contingency  plans for future 
policy or that the public  acts optimally  on such understanding  as it has. 
Besides the usual objection  that the public may not have the computa- 
tional capacity to absorb and quickly act on new information  about 
future policy, there is the problem that, historically, announcements 
about the future course of policy have often later turned out to be 
misleading.  Even if it were to announce  its plans  publicly,  therefore,  the 
policy authority  could not realistically  assume that the public  takes the 
announcement  seriously. 
Supporters  of the rational  expectations  assumption  have not ignored 
these difficulties  with  it. Kydland  and  Prescott  have  observed  that,  under 
rational  expectations, optimal  policy choice is time-inconsistent.3  That 
is, if a set of contingency  plans  for  current  and  future  c is chosen  optimally 
at t, the contingency plan chosen for c,,,  will generally not yield the 
same value for c,+? as the one that  would be chosen if the problem  were 
solved afresh at t + s. This occurs because under  the rational  expecta- 
tions assumption one may gain benefits at t from the effects of an 
announced  policy plan for period t +  s. It may be best to forgo some 
benefit  at t + s for the benefits  at t. Yet if the problem  is solved anew at 
t + s, those benefits  at t generated  by people's expectations  at t of how 
policy would be chosen at t + s have already  been formed  and will not 
be lost if those expectations  turn  out to be false. There  is no trade-off  of 
benefits  at t for benefits at t + s any longer, so the optimal  choice will 
ignore  the now-obsolete  trade-off. 
Whenever  the  effects of current  policy  choices depend  on  expectations 
of how future  policy will be chosen (and  whether  or not expectations  are 
rational)  there is likely to be an incentive  for policymakers  to renege  on 
previous  commitments  about  the nature  of future  policy plans.  This may 
explain why, historically, announcements  of future policy plans have 
frequently  not proved correct and why policymakers  encounter  public 
skepticism  over their  announced  intentions  for future  policy. 
Advocates of the rational  expectations  approach  have recognized  the 
strength  of the objections that the public  is not likely to absorb  and act 
quickly  on new information  about plans for future  policy and that, due 
to the inconsistency of optimal  policy under  rational  expectations, the 
3.  Finn E.  Kydland  and Edward C.  Prescott,  "Rules  Rather than Discretion:  The 
Inconsistency  of Optimal Plans, Journal of Political  Economy,  vol.  85 (June 1977), pp. 
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public is not likely even to believe announced  plans for future policy. 
Their  response has usually been to suggest that policy ought to follow 
fixed "rules." By a rule is meant a function, h, determining  c, as a 
function  of y,. That is, rather  than finding  the optimum  c, at t, a policy 
authority  following  a fixed rule  finds  the best h on the assumption  that it 
will set c, = h(y,)  now and at all dates in the future. The truly  optimum 
choice of c, on the rational expectations assumption would involve 
contingency  plans  in  which  a different  function,  h5,  was used  to determine 
cs from  y5  at each s in the future. 
The rational  expectations  assumption  is less unrealistic  when applied 
to analysis  of the long-run  effects of fixed  rules.  If the rule  is implemented 
and adhered  to for some time, people will eventually come to believe 
that there is a high probability  that future policy will be set using the 
rule. The difficulty  of getting the public to believe in announced  plans 
for future policy is thus eliminated. Also, in these circumstances  the 
public should eventually learn to adapt its behavioral  patterns so that 
they are not far from optimum  given the announced  rule-even  if only 
by trial and error. This removes the objection that the public may not 
have the computational  capacity  to adapt  optimally  to announced  plans 
for future  policy. 
But these arguments  only suggest limitations,  stringent  ones at that, 
to the range  of applicability  of rational  expectations analysis of policy. 
They should not be interpreted, as they sometimes have been,  as 
prescriptions  that policy should  always take the form of fixed rules and 
that  one should  be restricted  to analysis  of the effects of permanent  shifts 
in fixed rules. As I will argue  further  below, most analysis  of macroeco- 
nomic  policy is not properly  treated  as a problem  of choosing  an optimal 
fixed rule. This means that the rational  expectations assumption is a 
treacherous  tool in analyzing  most problems  of macroeconomic  policy 
choice. As shown  below, fortunately,  the rational  expectations  assump- 
tion is not the only logically  consistent  way to proceed  with  econometric 
policy analysis  in the face of the rational  expectations  critique. 
Valid Reduced Forms for Policy Analysis 
There  is a distinction  between actions policymakers  can take now, at 
t, and their plans for future actions. When this distinction is made 
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conditional  projections  of the effects of various  potential  policy actions 
is possible. Indeed, no reasonable  decision about policy action can be 
made  without  such a model. 
The rational  expectations critique argues that what happens to the 
economy  following  a policy action  depends  on the public's  expectations 
of the future  as well as on the current  action. But policy can affect the 
public's expectations only through  policy actions. While an incorrect 
model is certainly  capable of ignoring  these effects, there is no reason 
why a model necessarily  fails to include  indirect  effects of policy actions 
through  their  influence  on expectations.  When  a model  correctly  includes 
these effects, it will make valid conditional  projections  of the effects of 
policy and will be useful in guiding  policy choice. Control  theory could 
even properly  be used in conjunction  with such a model to guide policy 
choice. 
One kind of policy action is an announcement  of plans for future 
policy; one part of the state of the economy might  consist of previous 
announcements  about plans for policy. Rational  expectations analysis 
may help us understand  the effect of announcements  as policy actions. 
Kydland and Prescott might be regarded  as having explained, using 
rational  expectations,  why announcement  effects are  ordinarily  of minor 
importance.  Certainly  policy actions other than announcements  are at 
least as important as announcements themselves in influencing  the 
public's  beliefs about  future  policy. 
The fact that some effects of a policy action occur through  effects on 
expectations  does not necessarily  imply  that  one must  explicitly  identify 
the parameters  of expectation-formation  mechanisms  to obtain  models 
that correctly project the effects of the action. An analogy may be 
helpful.  Suppose  one wanted  to project  the effects on the peanut  market 
of an excise tax on peanuts.  The effects will depend  on parameters  both 
of the supply  curve and the demand  curve. But this is only because the 
reduced form of the model, which relates the excise tax to its conse- 
quences for peanut  prices and quantities,  depends  on the parameters  of 
supply  and  demand.  All one needs to know to discover the effects of the 
excise tax are the parameters of this reduced form. These may be 
discovered without explicitly determining  the parameters  of demand 
and  supply, and  their  usefulness  for projecting  the effects of policy does 
not depend on how they are discovered. Correspondingly,  effects of 
policy actions that affect expectation-formation  mechanisms can be 
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they do not explicitly display the parameters  of the expectation-forma- 
tion mechanism. 
Kydland  and Prescott display an example which purports  to show 
that attempts  to use reduced-form  models to make conditional  projec- 
tions and  then to choose policy actions on the basis of those projections 
is likely to lead to bad policy choices-precisely  the opposite of what is 
claimed here.4 In their example they assume that the economy is 
characterized  by a simple  rational  expectations  Phillips  curve, 
(1)  Ut =  a -  b[Pt -  Et-I(Pt)], 
where Ut  is the unemployment  rate  and  Pt is the price  level. They assume 
further that the policy authority has an objective function that puts 
negative  weight  on the level of unemployment  and  on the absolute  value 
of the rate of inflation  and that  Pt is directly  controlled  by policy. If the 
economy has long been in a situation  such that  Et  l (P,) = Pt I1,  that is, 
price  follows a random  walk and  expected inflation  is zero, econometri- 
cians might  correctly  discover that 
(2)  Ut =  a  -  b(Pt -  Pt 
If econometricians  took b in equation  2 to be structural,  in the sense of 
invariant  under  policy intervention,  they might  be misled  into suggesting 
that the mean of U, could be lowered by increasing  the mean rate of 
inflation.5  But obviously increasing  the mean  price  change  from  zero to, 
say, Q would change the public's price expectations. Assuming the 
public  adapts  its expectations to the new policy, eventually  E,_ I(P) = 
Pt l1 + Q,  which from 1 we can see would change  the constant  term  in 2 
from  a to a + bQ. The result would be a higher  mean level of inflation, 
but no change in the mean level of unemployment.  If econometricians 
mistakenly  supposed  that  there had  been an exogenous shift in a so that 
the new version of 2 with a increased  by bQ was taken  to be structural, 
they could repeat  their  initial  mistaken  analysis  and advice. The contin- 
4.  Ibid. 
5.  This  use  of  "structural"  to  mean  invariant  under  intervention  follows  Leonid 
Hurwicz,  "On the  Structural Form of Interdependent  Systems,"  in Ernest  Nagel  and 
others, eds.,  Logic,  Methodology  and Philosophy  of Science  (Stanford University  Press, 
1962), pp. 232-39; and Tjalling C. Koopmans  and Augustus F. Bausch,  "Selected  Topics 
in Economics  Involving Mathematical Reasoning,"  SIAM Review,  vol.  1 (July 1959), pp. 
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ued revision of 2 and change in the mean rate of inflation  that would 
come with repeated  attempts  to affect unemployment  by manipulating 
inflation  could eventually result in a stable equilibrium  in which the 
ultimate  version of 2 implied  a trade-off  between increased  inflation  and 
decreased unemployment  such that no further  change in the inflation 
rate  appeared  desirable. 
What  this example  shows is only that  a false reduced  form  can lead to 
bad policy. If there are no announcement  effects, or if the public does 
not pay attention  to such announcements  as they are  made, the public's 
expectations  about  future  prices can be affected  only by history. 
The public's  expectations  depend  on the mechanism  they use to learn 
about policy formation,  but in the absence of direct observation  of the 
psychology and politics of policymaking,  their price expectations will 
be based  only on the history  of prices  and  unemployment.  This  is because 
prices and unemployment are the only variables of interest to the 
policymakers and because setting the price level is the only action 
available  to them. 
There  are no other  influences  on the economy to which policymakers 
might  be responding.  But expectations  will depend  in a complicated  way 
on the whole history  of prices and  unemployment  up to the current  date. 
The correct reduced form, therefore, must make the current  level of 
unemployment  depend on the current  price and many lagged values of 
prices, probably in a nonlinear  way. The mistaken course of policy 
Kydland  and Prescott describe depends on econometricians  persisting 
in believing  in the incorrect  reduced-form  2, even as policy produces  a 
historical sample in which it should become quite clear that 2 is not 
correct. If instead econometricians  experimented  with distributed  lag 
versions of 2 during  the policy of deliberate  inflation,  they would soon 
discover that the correct specification  makes the unemployment  rate 
depend on something closer to the difference between the current 
inflation  rate  and  its recent  average  level. Even an approximate  reduced 
form  of this nature  would lead them to suggest a policy not far  from the 
optimal  one, and it would not be necessary that they realize that the 
underlying  behavioral  model was 1. 
Not only are valid reduced  forms possible, they are essential. Econ- 
omists may confine themselves to rational expectations analysis of 
the effects of permanent  changes  in policy rule, renouncing  any claim  to 
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But before they can recommend  that a change in rule be implemented, 
they must somehow decide whether  it is likely that there will be short- 
run  negative  consequences to making  the change  large  enough  to offset 
the permanent  long-run  gains. Such an assessment necessarily is based 
on a probability  distribution  for the immediate consequences of the 
change  in rule, that is, on a reduced-form  model. 
Regime Shifts versus Normal Policymaking 
From  the above discussion it can be seen that  for policy analysis  one 
needs a valid reduced-form  model and that one can know the form of 
such a model without  knowing  how expectation-formation  mechanisms 
are embedded in it. It is also apparent  that a valid reduced form will 
make relatively  precise conditional  projections  for the effects of policy 
actions or sequences of actions that are close in form to what has been 
observed historically. The role of a priori knowledge, or subjective 
guesswork, in the projections  one makes with the valid reduced-form 
model will be increased as one makes projections conditional on se- 
quences of policy actions more remote from what has been observed 
historically. 
Rational expectations analysis has focused attention on a type of 
action  that can be analyzed  only with strong  a priori  assumptions  about 
the behavior  of the private  sector-a  one-time shift in regime  or policy 
rule. The change  in rule  will result  in a sequence of policy actions that  is 
completely  without  precedent, so there is no hope of simply looking at 
the historical  data  for similar  sequences  of actions  to determine  the likely 
consequences. 
But permanent  shifts in policy regime  are by definition  rare  events. If 
they occurred  often they would not be permanent.  Political  rhetoric  that 
sounds  as if it is concerned  with a permanent  change  in the policy rule  is 
not rare. This is only natural  when groups with different  interests and 
ideals  contend  for control  of policy. Each would change  the rule  if given 
exclusive and permanent  control of policy. In a system in which this 
does not happen policy is generated  by a steady, though not entirely 
predictable, swinging of  the political pendulum. These  swings are 
reversible, and the public understands  them to be so. They are not 
changes in the policy rule of the type for which rational  expectations 
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Normally  policy actions are  generated  by a mechanism  that, from  the 
point  of view of the public,  forms  a more  or  less stable  stochastic  process  . 
Treated as an abstract problem in control theory, this situation may 
seem to present no interesting analytical difficulties;  it may seem to 
arise  only when policymakers  are satisfied  with a preexisting  solution  to 
the control  problem.  But as I argue  above, solutions  to dynamic  decision 
problems are not in fact computed once for all. They are regularly 
recomputed  with  increased  precision  in  the analysis  of the consequences 
of current  and immediate  future  policy actions. These recurrent  reeval- 
uations of policy options are, by construction,  frequent.  Although  any 
one of them may be of less social importance  than a single permanent 
shift  of policy regime,  they are  nonetheless  cumulatively  important.  Use 
of valid reduced forms to project the likely consequences of various 
possible policy actions has been and will continue  to be a useful part  of 
this continuing  process of normal  policymaking. 
Even in normal  policymaking,  the question of evaluating  the effects 
of unprecedented  policy actions arises. As one solves the problem  of 
optimal  choice of ct  at t, one must  in principle  project  the effects of every 
possible set of contingency  plans for policy action and  choose the best. 
Some of those possible contingency  plans will be far out of the range  of 
historical  experience. But in a world of shifting  political fortunes and 
imperfect  analysis by policymakers, the historical  record will show a 
considerable range of policy actions, and the strongest disputes are 
likely to be between people advocating  policy actions of types that  have 
been tried  before. The historical  record  is likely  to be especially  valuable 
in projecting  the effects of such actions. Radically  new types of policy 
are  likely  to be, and  ought  to be, discounted  because it is recognized  that 
their  effects are uncertain.  For a formal  decision-theoretic  approach  to 
do this discounting  properly,  the reduced-form  model used would have 
to recognize explicitly the uncertainty  about the a priori restrictions 
embodied in the model's specification. Informally  the same effect is 
obtained  when policymakers  treat  suggestions  for radical  shifts  in policy 
skeptically, even when the point estimates from econometric models 
suggest  that the results  would be good. 
There are cases that seem intermediate  between the case of a pure 
permanent  shift in regime  and  the case of normal  policymaking. 
Suppose, for example, that policy is concerned  only with setting the 
money stock and that there are just two views on how this should be 
done, view A  and view  B.  There is  an unobservable variable, st, 120  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
measuring  the political  strength  of A relative  to B, and  the actual  money 
stock is determined  by a well-defined  function  with s, as an argument. 
For example, s, might  range  between zero and 1 and in each period  the 
actual  m, might  be m  ts,  +  m/B (1 -  s,), where mA  and  mB  are the values 
favored  under  views A and B. If the shift back and  forth  between views 
A and B occurred  persistently, it would eventually generate historical 
data  covering all values of st. From the point of view of the public, the 
two views and  the stochastic  process for stjointly  generate  actual  policy 
choice according  to a single probability  mechanism.  One can therefore 
expect, from analysis of a sufficiently  long stretch  of data, to obtain  by 
direct  observation  useful  information  about  how the state  of the economy 
responds  to policy actions, just as in any situation  in which policy has 
been generated  by a single  probability  mechanism  in the historical  data. 
Of course, a fully accurate  model would be quite nonlinear.  One might 
hope,'though,  that it could be well approximated  by a linear  model with 
unknown  stochastically  varying  coefficients.  Since there  is no particular 
reason  to suppose the economy is well characterized  by a linear  model 
with fixed coefficients even in the absence of complicated  probability 
mechanisms  for policy formation, it is not clear that the problem of 
estimating  the response of the economy to policy is fundamentally  more 
difficult in the presence of such persistent oscillation in the policy 
mechanism  than  in its absence. 
This argument  is not meant to deny that explicit modeling  of expec- 
tation  formation  and its dependence  on policy could be useful. If in the 
example s, changed slowly with time, there might be long periods in 
which  it was nearly 1 or nearly  zero. A rational  expectations  analysis  of 
data  drawn  entirely  from  a period  with  st  near  zero  might,  from  knowledge 
of the  policy mechanism  favored  by view B and  use of a priori  identifying 
restrictions,  succeed in predicting  how the economy would behave in a 
period with s, near 1. Thus explicit modeling of the connection of 
expectation-formation  mechanisms  to policy in an accurately  identified 
model  would  allow  better  use of the data.  The  resulting  probability  model 
for the effects of policy actions would, with a given amount  of data, be 
sharper  in the sense of providing  less uncertain  predictions.  The model 
estimated  without  using so much  previous  knowledge  would, however, 
still be a true probability model, giving an accurate picture of the 
uncertainty  in its own predictions.  And its validity  would not depend  on 
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The Case for Empirical Policy Analysis 
Returning  to the example of the excise tax on peanuts, how can one 
estimate the reduced form needed? If there had never before been an 
excise tax on peanuts, one would have to rely on hunch  and intuition  to 
generate  identifying  restrictions.  With  these one could estimate supply 
and  demand  curves. In effect, one would  be applying  a priori  restrictions 
to use historically  observed data on variation  in things other than an 
excise tax (supply  and  demand  shifts)  to estimate  the effects of an excise 
tax. 
At the opposite extreme, there might have been a great deal of 
historically  observed variation  in excise taxes, all of it generated by 
considerations  (fiscal needs of the government,  for example)  unrelated 
to random  disturbances  to supply and demand  for peanuts. Then one 
could  estimate  the required  reduced  form  by regression  (possibly  nonlin- 
ear, possibly dynamic)  of price and quantity  of peanuts,  on the tax rate 
in the historical  sample. Even in this case one would be using some a 
priori restrictions, choosing some functional  form for the regression, 
and  assuming  that  form  to be stable in time. 
Intermediate  cases are possible also. The tax rate might  be strongly 
related to employment in the whole economy, for example. It would 
then  not  be predetermined,  but  with  some  knowledge  about  determinants 
of employment  and their relation  to the peanut market,  one might  find 
identifying  assumptions  that  permitted  estimation  of the effect of the tax 
on peanut quantity  and price (for instance, by finding  an instrumental 
variable  for the tax rate). In this case one would be using some a priori 
restrictions  on the private sector in the estimation,  but the supply and 
demand  of peanuts  would not need to be estimated. 
As another  example,  if a change  in  the  money  stock  were  contemplated 
and  the money stock had never changed  in recorded  history, the task of 
using historical data to estimate a valid reduced form to predict the 
effects of a change in the money stock would be difficult,  though not 
impossible. One would have to invoke hypotheses about how variation 
in other things  could be used to deduce the effect of variation  in money 
supply.  If there  had  been some variation  in money supply  historically,  it 
would be possible to obtain more accurate estimates of the effects of 
money-supply  variation,  and one would probably  abandon  some of the 
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in the money supply. The smaller that variation is  relative to the 
contemplated  change in the money supply, the less reliable  would be 
conditional  forecasts based on the historical data. This is simply an 
example  of the general  principle  that  extrapolation  of a statistical  model 
far  beyond  the range  of history  to which  the  model  was fit  yields  unreliable 
results.  This unreliability  arises  because the model's extrapolations  lean 
more heavily on aspects of the specification  dependent  on one's inevi- 
tably uncertain  a priori  beliefs, less on evidence from the data, as the 
conditions  from  which one extrapolates  move further  away from  histor- 
ical experience. 
All the points  in the preceding  paragraph  are  commonplace  to anyone 
who has used statistical  models. They have nothing  to do with rational 
expectations in principle.  The rational  expectations critique  of econo- 
metric policy analysis has been taken by some to show that policy 
analysis  based  on attempts  to extrapolate  the effects of alternative  policy 
actions using econometric models is logically unsound. A careful  look 
into the matter, however, reveals that this is  not so.  The rational 
expectations  critique  is only a special  case of the more  general  cautionary 
note-statistical  models are likely to become unreliable  when extrapo- 
lated  to make  predictions  for  conditions  far  outside  the range  experienced 
in the sample. 
One  of the main  contributions  of the rational  expectations  assumption 
to macroeconomics  has been to provide  examples showing  how even a 
sequence of policy actions, c,  whose size at each date, t, is within the 
historically  normal  range  could  be far  outside  the  range  of past  experience 
in the relevant sense if its time pattern  were historically  unusual. The 
same considerations  that would lead to caution  in predicting  the effects 
of an increase in c, of 25 percent in one quarter  when the historical 
standard  error  of quarterly  changes in c, is 3 percent should  also signal 
caution about predicting  the effects of twelve successive quarters  of 
positive 3 percent change in c, when historically  c, has behaved like a 
serially  uncorrelated  stochastic  process. Both  types of action  are  outside 
the historically  normal  range;  both would have effects on the public's 
prediction  methods  and uncertainty  levels. 
Are Existing Large-Scale Models Useful? 
I have argued elsewhere that existing large-scale models embody 
identifying  restrictions  that are not in fact believed, even as approxima- Christopher A.  Sims  123 
tions, by most economists.6  I also argued,  though,  that they represent  a 
valuable summary of a great deal of historical experience and that 
forecasts from them are useful. The reason is  that the identifying 
restrictions  are pragmatically  adjusted  to avoid obvious conflicts with 
the data, so that  they can be regarded  as convenient simplifications,  not 
as a priori  knowledge  imposed on the data. According  to this interpre- 
tation,  the restrictions  cannot  in  fact be of value  in identifying  the model, 
though  they are useful in improving  its forecasting  performance. 
Though this is harsh criticism, it does not lead to the iconoclastic 
conclusion  of Lucas and  Sargent:  "that  modern  macroeconomic  models 
are of no  value in guiding policy and that this condition will not be 
remedied by modifications along any line which is  currently being 
pursued.  "7 They seem to base this conclusion  on the view that  no aspect 
of the structure  of such models is likely to remain  fixed under policy 
interventions  because of the rational  expectations  critique.  It should  be 
clear  by now that  if this paper's  argument  is accepted, the only aspect of 
a model's identification  that is crucial  to its yielding  useful projections 
of the effects of policy is its distinction  between policy-setting  behavior 
and the behavior of the public given policy acts. False "identifying" 
restrictions  that do not distort  the conditional  forecasting  properties  of 
the model's sector displaying  the reaction of the public to policy acts 
will not prevent the model from making  useful conditional  forecasts of 
policy effects. There  is a real  question  as to how accurately  these models 
identify  the reaction  of the public  to policy, as will be shown in the next 
section. However, these reasons for doubt apply just as strongly to 
existing  empirical  implementations  of rational  expectations  concepts. 
Existing large-scale models are useful as they stand, and there are 
plenty  of currently  suggested  lines of work, mostly not based on rational 
expectations,  which are likely to improve  such models. 
Identification 
While the valid reduced forms discussed above are reduced in the 
sense that they do not require  explicit estimation  of all the behavioral 
6.  "Macroeconomics  and Reality." 
7.  "After  Keynesian  Macroeconomics,"  in Federal Reserve  Bank of Boston,  After 
the Phillips  Curve: Persistence  of High Inflation and High  Unemployment,  Conference 
Series  19 (FRBB  1978), p. 50, reprinted in Robert E. Lucas,  Jr., and Thomas J. Sargent, 
eds.,  Rational  Expectations  and Econometric  Practice,  vol.  1 (University  of Minnesota 
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parameters  of the private  sector, they are not the standard  reduced  form 
of econometric  theory except in special cases. For one thing, predeter- 
mined  variables  that  are not policy variables  are still  part  of the state-of- 
the-economy  vector. Because the models discussed here give a condi- 
tional  distribution  for the full state-of-the-economy  vector next period, 
they must  include  equations  for every nonpolicy  variable  in that vector. 
More importantly,  every policy variable  is an explanatory  variable  in 
these models. A standard  reduced form contains only predetermined 
variables  as explanatory  variables. Policy variables  need not be prede- 
termined.  When they are not, estimation of the type of reduced form 
under  discussion raises the usual problems  of identifying  parameters  in 
a simultaneous  equations  model. 
While  the  rational  expectations  critique  of econometric  policy  analysis 
is not as fatal as it might seem, imposing rational expectations does 
create  difficulties  in distinguishing  between policy behavior  and private 
sector  response  that  have  not  been  confronted  in  most  macroeconometric 
work, even in work that assumes rational expectations. The Lucas 
critique  explains that one must rethink  the definition  of structure,  and 
hence of identification,  when choosing a fixed policy rule.8  It does not 
directly  say anything  about  the problem  of identifying  and  distinguishing 
between policy actions and public reaction. Indeed, the simple models 
commonly used to illustrate the Lucas critique handle this kind of 
identification  problem  by assuming  that policy variables  are predeter- 
mined, which is the same assumption as that underlying  the usual 
approach  to estimating  and simulating  standard  macro  models. 
For example, Sargent  and Wallace  use a model with reduced  form: 
(3)  Yt =  ao +  alyt_I  +  ut +  a3et, 
where  ut  is the disturbance  to an aggregate  supply  equation,  Yt  is output, 
and et is the disturbance  to the money-supply  equation.9  Their  point is 
that equation 3 does not contain the parameters  of the money-supply 
rule, and hence the choice  of  those parameters cannot affect the 
stochastic  behavior  of  yt. But  they introduce  their  paper  with  a discussion 
8.  Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Econometric  Policy Evaluation: A Critique,"in Karl Brunner 
and Allan H. Meltzer,  eds.,  The Phillips  Curve and Labor Markets, Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, vol.  1 (Amsterdam: North-Holland,  1976), pp. 19-46. 
9.  Thomas J. Sargent and Neil  Wallace,  "Rational Expectations  and the Theory of 
Economic Policy,"  Journal of Monetary Economics,  vol. 2 (April 1976), pp. 169-83. Christopher A.  Sims  125 
of Milton  Friedman's  proposed  fixed  percentage  growth  rate  rule  for the 
money stock, making it clear that they are presenting grounds for 
believing such a rule would not be suboptimal.  In their model if such a 
rule  did not eliminate  or reduce variance  in et it would have no effect at 
all  and  there  would  be little  point  in discussing  it. There  is thus  an  implicit 
assumption that 3 would remain fixed not only for changes in the 
systematic  part  of the policy rule but also for changes in the stochastic 
behavior  of e.  In particular,  a change  in rule  that set the variance  in et  to 
zero would leave 3 invariant.  Furthermore,  the main  reason for paying 
attention  to 3 is that there are strong,  relatively  well-behaved,  dynamic 
statistical  relations  between the money stock and  y, in historical  data. 
Equation 3 explains this observation as arising  from a connection 
between random disturbances in money supply and movements in 
output, but without further  assumptions  one can neither interpret  this 
connection as causal nor draw policy conclusions. Part of the money- 
supply  disturbance  may not be generated  by policy; and  at least this part 
may be affected by contemporaneous  movements in disturbances  to 
other equations in the system. If these possibilities are important  in 
practice,  the monetarist  implications  of 3 would  be substantially  altered, 
even though  the formal  conclusion  that  changes  in the parameters  of the 
money-supply  rule do not affect the behavior  of Yt  would remain  valid. 
In the extreme, if no part  of the disturbance  to money supply could be 
affected  by policy, then no monetary  rule could affect  Yt  and discussion 
of the Friedman  rule  would  be pointless. In making  conditional  forecasts 
of the effects of policy, it is necessary to identify the policy-induced 
component  of et and to make an assumption  about how u, responds to 
this component. 
The assumptions  that Sargent  and Wallace make, that et is uncorre- 
lated with other disturbances and that the money-supply equation 
involves no current  values of variables  other  than  money, amount  to the 
standard  assumption  of simultaneous  equations  econometrics-that the 
money stock is  predetermined. The assertion that money stock is 
predetermined  is not testable by itself because, as is well known, any 
simultaneous  equations model can be transformed  to a Wold causal 
chain  form, in which an arbitrarily  chosen variable  becomes predeter- 
mined  in all but one of the equations.  It is, however, testable  jointly with 
other  restrictions.  In a BPEA paper  ten years ago Goldfeld  and Blinder 
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variables  for policy variables  in estimating  the system. Instruments  were 
available  because of maintained  hypotheses  on the form  of the nonpolicy 
equations  of the system.  10  It is often-perhaps even nearly  always-the 
case that an assertion that policy variables are predetermined  can be 
plausible  only because of a belief that policy can respond  to nonpolicy 
variables  only with a delay. For the delay to be exactly one period  in the 
time units in which the data happen  to be measured  would be a bizarre 
coincidence in most applications.  If the delay is more than one period, 
and  one imposes  this delay  in the  form  of the policy-formation  equations, 
overidentifying  restrictions are generated that allow testing for the 
predeterminedness  of policy variables  without  restrictions  on the non- 
policy equations  of the system. In the limit  as the delay  becomes infinite, 
so that there is no feedback from nonpolicy variables  to policy, policy 
variable  predeterminedness  is equivalent  to exogeneity, which  is testable 
by methods  I have described  elsewhere.11 
Economists are accustomed to testing their specifications,  formally 
and  informally,  for  the  presence  of substantial  feedback  over  time  periods 
of a quarter  or a year. In the case of the money stock, I and others have 
tested a strict  exogeneity assumption  and  found  it well supported  by the 
U.S. data in small systems not including  an interest  rate. Although  his 
statistical  work  is less formal,  Friedman's  empirical  work  on the relation 
of money and income is most naturally  interpreted  as building  evidence 
for a predeterminedness  assumption.  His work acknowledges  the pos- 
sibility that feedback exists and that some of the observed cyclical 
variation  in money stock represents  response of the stock to changes in 
business conditions  rather  than deliberate  policy-induced  shifts, but he 
brings  forward  evidence that  most of the large  variations  in the stock did 
not result from feedback. His use of evidence on the relative timing  of 
turning  points  in the money stock and  in  business  activity  is one category 
of such evidence. But he also tries to show that the time from a turning 
point in the money stock to a subsequent turning  point in business 
activity is less variable than the corresponding  gap when the turning 
point in business activity precedes that in the money stock. And he 
10.  Stephen  M. Goldfeld  and Alan S.  Blinder,  "Some  Implications  of Endogenous 
Stabilization Policy,"  BPEA, 3:1972, pp. 585-640. 
11.  "Exogeneity  and  Causal  Ordering in  Macroeconometric  Models,"  in  Federal 
Reserve  Bank of Minneapolis,  New  Methods  in Business  Cycle Research  (FRBM  1977), 
pp. 23-43,  and "Money,  Income,  and Causality,"  American Economic  Review,  vol.  62 
(September  1972), pp. 540-52. Christopher A.  Sims  127 
displays evidence that the variability  of the money stock is related to 
subsequent variability  in business activity."2  I interpret  Friedman  as 
trying to convince us that most of the observed correlation  of money 
with  income stems from  the correlation  of unpredictable  disturbances  in 
the money stock with subsequent  movements  in income. This amounts 
to convincing  us that money can appropriately  be treated  as predeter- 
mined. 
But evidence, of whatever sort, that money stock is predetermined 
can only show that a reasonable statistical  model can be developed in 
which one equation  is a regression  of money stock on lagged values of 
other  variables  and in which this equation's  disturbance  is independent 
of other equations' disturbances.  Such evidence can never prove that 
the equation  in question, or its disturbances,  is actually  what  we think  it 
is-a  reflection  of monetary  policy choices. The application  of rational 
expectations  to financial  market  modeling  has generated  a wide range  of 
examples in which speculative arbitrage  gives a misleading  impression 
of exogeneity and causality. These examples give good reason for 
concern  that  usual  econometric  analysis,  including  especially  monetarist 
models, may be badly biased by an identification  problem. Variables 
determined  in financial  markets,  such as interest  rates, asset prices, and 
nominal  stocks of assets, are  likely to appear  predetermined  and  to have 
substantial  explanatory  power for other variables in the model, even 
when they are only passive reflections  of real  economic activity. 
That this can occur with, say, a stock price, is not hard to see. 
Obviously for small time-intervals,  to a reasonable approximation,  a 
stock price must  follow: 
(4)  E,(P,  =  1P, 
where P, is the stock price and E, is expectation conditional  on infor- 
mation  available  at t. If 4 were  far  from  true,  there  would  be a predictable 
component  to price changes, creating  room for arbitrage  profits. Even 
for a small company, there is likely to be a relation  between earnings 
and  business cycle conditions, not because the company's  performance 
12. These  remarks refer to Milton Friedman, "The Demand for Money: some Theo- 
retical and Empirical Results,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  vol. 67 (August  1959), pp. 
327-51; "The Lag in the Effect of Monetary Policy,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  vol. 
69 (October 1961), pp. 447-66; and Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz,  "Money  and 
Business  Cycles,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics,  vol.  45, no.  1, pt. 2 (February 
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affects  GNP, but because general  economic conditions  affect the com- 
pany's performance.  Yet 4 implies that P,, I -  P, is uncorrelated  with 
GNP occurring  at t or earlier.  The level of Pt has already  captured  any 
predictable  effect on Pt, 1 of GNP occurring  at t or earlier.  Thus  Pt,  - 
Pt  is correlated  only with information  about  GNP that  is new at t + 1. 
If the public has ways of anticipating  movements in GNP that are 
better than extrapolating  past movements in GNP itself, Pt will have 
predictive  value for GNP beyond that contained  in past values of GNP 
itself. Yet 4 implies  that  GNP does not help predict  P in this sense. As is 
by now well understood, this implies that there is a distributed  lag 
regression  of GNP on P with exogenous P. 13 
More intuitively, historical  investigators  will find that major  move- 
ments in GNP are preceded by unpredicted  movements in P.  If they 
were already disposed to think that movements in P  were causing 
movements  in GNP, this finding  might appear  to confirm  their belief. 
Nonetheless, it is clear  that  for an asset price  like this such a finding  does 
not  indicate  that  the correlations  of P with  GNP represent  a causal  effect 
of P on GNP. Arbitrage  and  forecasting  creates a pattern  of correlations 
that  mimics  what  would reasonably  be expected of a causal  relation. 
No one is likely to be misled into thinking  a single company's equity 
prices  determine  GNP;  but  when  an  asset price  is an  overall  stock market 
index, or a long-term  interest  rate, or Tobin's  q, the risk  may  be greater. 
In  fact the risk even exists for the stock of money. 
The stock of money is, of course, not an asset price. It is not even the 
product  of a market  price  with a quantity  of an asset. One  is accustomed 
to thinking  of it as in effect set by the monetary  authority.  As I have 
argued  elsewhere, it is therefore  not apparent  that worries  about statis- 
tical exogeneity of money being induced  by speculative activity are of 
any importance.  14 But it is in fact plausible  that much movement  in the 
money stock, particularly  in the short run, is responsive to demand.  It 
is possible to construct a rational  expectations, equilibrium  model in 
which the monetary authority is  completely passive, in which the 
stochastic process generating output could not be  affected by  the 
monetary  authorities  even if they attempted  to do so, yet in which  money 
stock  has predictive  power  for output  and  is statistically  exogenous. 
One  way to construct  such a model is to introduce  money into Hall's 
13. See my "Money,  Income,  and  Causality." 
14. "Exogeneity  and  Causal  Ordering." Christopher A. Sims  129 
permanent  income consumption  model."5  Hall assumes that consumers 
maximize  expected lifetime  utility  of the form, 
(5)  EL>(I  + 6)sU(C)1  =o 
subject  to the budget  constraints, 
(6)  Ct +  Wt  =  Yt  + (I + rt)Wt+l,  t = O,.  .., 
where Ct  is consumption, Wt  is net worth, rt  is the interest  rate, 8 is the 
subjective  discount  rate, and Yt  is income. The budget  constraints  imply 
that borrowing or lending at the same rate, rt, is possible for each 
consumer,  regardless  of that  consumer's  current  net worth. 
If rt is fixed forever at r, and if Yt  is given exogenously, Hall shows 
that  a necessary condition  for a solution  to the consumer's  optimization 
problem  is 
(7)  Et(DUt+I) =  [(1 +  8)/(1 +  r)]DUt, 
where  DUt =  U'(Ct).  As in equation  4 and  the stock price example, this 
implies that the marginal  utility of consumption will behave like an 
exogenous variable  in any model including  it and any other variables 
observable  by the public  at t. Because in this  problemD  Ut  is a monotonic 
function of Ct, the latter will itself behave to a close approximation  as 
exogenous. It will be exactly exogenous if U is quadratic. 
Now suppose there is a transactions  demand  for noninterest-bearing 
money,  Mt,  which  depends  on the volume  of consumption.  This  idea can 
be represented  by including  money  as an  argument  in the utility  function. 
Then U(Cs)  in 5 can be replaced  by U(Cs,  Ms)  and  the constraints  6 by 
(8)  Ct  + Wt  + Mt  = Yt  + Mt_- + (I + rt)  Wt_-  t =  O.... 
The first-order  condition, equation  7, is unaffected  by adding  Mt  to the 
problem,  except that in it DUt is replaced  by DI  Ut = aU(Ct,  Mt)/aCt. It 
still can be interpreted  as "saying that marginal  utility  of income is best 
predicted  by its own current  value," but  now, in general,  marginal  utility 
of consumption  depends  on M as well as C. 
15.  Robert E.  Hall,  "Stochastic  Implications  of the  Life Cycle-Permanent  Income 
Hypothesis:  Theory  and Evidence,"  Journal of Political  Economy,  vol.  86 (December 
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One additional  first-order  condition can be obtained for the extra 
choice variable,  M: 
(9)  D2Ut  = DI Ut -  Et(DI  Ut+  1)/(l +  8). 
But from 7 this is 
(10)  D2Ut  =  [r/(1 +  r)]DiUt. 
Equation 10 provides an exact contemporaneous  relation  between Mt 
and Ct. Because of  this exact dependence, the marginal utility of 
consumption  can be written  as a function  of either  Ct  or Mt  alone. Hence 
the fact that marginal  utility is its own best predictor  means that this is 
approximately  true also for both Mt  and Ct.  Both would  be exactly their 
own best predictors  if U were quadratic. 
Hall's is a version of the permanent  income theory of consumption 
and  implies  the familiar  distributed  lag relation  of income  with  consump- 
tion-though  with consumption, not income, exogenous. With Mt a 
function  of current  Ct, clearly  Mt  is also strongly  related  to income and 
predetermined. 
The example treats the price level as fixed and hence implies that 
monetary policy ratifies the shifts in money demand that occur as 
permanent  income shifts, keeping the price level fixed by open market 
operations in the single commodity. In this sense monetary  policy is 
completely passive. The statistical  exogeneity of money in distributed 
lag regressions  of income on money in this model  has nothing  to do with 
predeterminedness  of policy decisions. 
The most serious objection to the model, which applies also to the 
original  Hall  model, is that  no reasonable  general  equilibrium  framework 
could leave real interest rates fixed forever. Equation 7 implies that 
marginal  utility cannot be a stationary  stochastic process with positive 
mean. This is because with fixed r, optimal accumulation leads to 
consumption  drifting  off to zero or infinity. Thus the model must be 
taken as an approximation.  If rt  is a continuous  function  of time, 7 will 
be true to an arbitrarily  close approximation  with data measured at 
sufficiently  small  time intervals.  16 
16.  The approximation involved here is really the same as that needed to justify 4, the 
equation describing  the unpredictability  of stock  prices.  That equation  ignores interest 
rate effects and cannot hold exactly  in the face of a random interest rate. But both 4 and 7 
will work arbitrarily well as econometric  specifications,  in a certain sense,  if the time unit 
is  small.  The argument for this is given  in my  "Martingale-Like  Behavior  of  Prices," 
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This example  is not meant  to be taken as an assertion  about the way 
the world works. It is an illustration  showing that we cannot take a 
demonstration  that  money stock  is statistically  predetermined  to be good 
evidence that dynamic  regressions  of real variables  on the money stock 
display  the effect  of monetary  policy  disturbances  on those real  variables. 
Although  the example includes some arbitrary  assumptions,  it is in this 
respect like rational  expectations models of the Phillips curve, which 
illustrate  that  one cannot  suppose  that  a Phillips  curve  will remain  stable 
under  a change in monetary  policy rule. It also functions like Tobin's 
model, which, while holding  money passive, generates  timing  relations 
among  money stock and real variables  like those found by Friedman.  17 
The present example generates a stochastic process for money and 
income in which movements in output are preceded by unpredictable 
movements  in money stock, even though  monetary  policy has nothing 
to do with generating  the movements  in output. 
Such an example can be considerably  elaborated-to  include a role 
for money as a buffer  against  temporary  fluctuations  in income, to relate 
transactions  demand  for money to current  income as well as consump- 
tion, to allow for the possibility of inflation. But even a much more 
realistic example could preserve the basic idea that changes in money 
demand,  accommodated  by the monetary  authority,  reflect  anticipations 
of future  fluctuations  in real activity. 
Granger  causal  priority  of money-the  condition  that  the  best forecast 
of money be formed from lagged values of money alone-remains  a 
characteristic of  U.S.  data through the current period for systems 
including money, prices, and a measure of real activity. A natural 
measure of the degree to which Granger  causal priority holds is the 
percentage  of forecast error  variance  accounted  for by a variable's  own 
future disturbances  in a multivariate  linear autoregressive model. In 
such  a system the k-step  ahead  forecast  error  for each variable  is a linear 
combination  of forecast errors 1 through  k steps ahead in the variable 
itself and in other variables  in the system. A variable  that is optimally 
forecast from its own lagged values will have all its forecast error 
variance  accounted  for  by its own disturbances.  Table 1  displays  results, 
shown  in parentheses,  for a three-variable  system formed  from  MI  , real 
GNP, and the GNP deflator  and estimated  from data through  the third 
17.  James  Tobin,  "Money  and Income:  Post  Hoc  Ergo  Propter Hoc?"  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics,  vol. 84 (May 1970), pp. 301-17. Figure 1. Dynamics of the Three-Variable  Systema 
Response  to shock in Ml 
Price deflator 
Ml 
,  ,  I  ,  I  I  ,  I 
Response  to shock in price deflator 
Real GNP 
Pr-ice  deflator- 
Ml 
Response to shock in real GNP 
Real GNP 
Price deflator 
M  I 
1  2  3  4 
Year 
a.  See  the discussion  of table  I in the text  and the appendix  for details.  The variables are defined in the notes  to 
table 2. The vertical scale  makes  the distance  from one  horizontal axis to the one  above  it correspond  to  I percent 
of the original level  of the variables before the shock. Christopher A. Sims  133 
Table 1.  Percentage  Variance Decompositions,  Six and Fourteen Quarters Ahead, 
in Three- and Six-Variable  Autoregressive  Systems, 1948:3 through 1981:3a 
Error  variance 
Thr  ee- 
For  ecast  mnonith  Feder  al 
Innovation  horizon  Tr  easlury  GNP  Real  expendi-  Federal 
variable  (quarters)  Ml  bill rate  deflator  GNP  tures  revenues 
Ml  6  (96.0)  ...  (19.1)  (41.0)  ...  ... 
6  57.5  25.4  29.7  15.1  4.7  27.2 
14  (81.0)  ..  .  (38.0)  (36.0)  . . .  ... 
14  39.1  24.0  33.7  13.9  7.5  24.4 
Three-month Treasury  6  35.4  72.6  0.3  21.4  1.3  4.5 
bill rate  14  31.5  72.8  2.7  18.5  1.3  5.3 
GNP deflator  6  (1.6)  ...  (80.3)  (0.3)  ...  ... 
6  2.1  0.5  65.7  0.4  20.1  16.7 
14  (11.7)  ...  (59.7)  (4.5)  ... 
14  9.6  1.1  47.7  3.7  22.4  16.7 
Real GNP  6  (2.4)  ...  (0.6)  (58.8)  ...  ... 
6  1.5  0.2  0.9  56.5  8.1  18.2 
14  (7.3)  ...  (2.4)  (59.5)  ...  ... 
14  8.2  1.1  1.5  47.4  12.7  19.8 
Federal expenditures  6  1.5  1.1  2.8  0.8  60.1  1.1 
14  1.6  1.2  2.0  1.6  47.7  1.5 
Federal revenues  6  1.9  0.2  0.5  5.8  4.6  32.3 
14  10.1  0.4  7.3  15.0  8.4  32.3 
Sources: Estimations  by the author  based  on data  from  the national  income  and product  accounts  and the Board 
of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System. 
a. Entries  show the percentage  of forecast  error  variance,  six and  fourteen  quarters  ahead,  that is accounted  for 
by innovations  in the variables  in the first  column.  Entries  in parentheses  are  for the three-variable  system;  all others 
are for the six-variable  system. 
quarter  of 1981, allowing  for parameter  drift.18  MI emerges as Granger 
causally  prior  to a close approximation,  while accounting  for substantial 
parts of the variance  in GNP and the deflator.  Figure 1 shows that the 
estimated  response of the system to a disturbance  in money stock is just 
18. Because  the system  allows  for time  varying  parameters,  it is not linear.  Stochastic 
parameters  multiply  the random  variables  on the right-hand  side of each equation.  Thus 
the summary  statistics in table 1 are not the model's implications  about actual  forecast 
errors.  They are instead  its implications  about  forecast errors  assuming  the 1981:4  esti- 
mates  of the coefficients  were to remain  fixed. If parameters  actually  changed  rapidly  in 
the  estimated  model, such statistics  would  be of limited  interest,  but  the model  implies  the 
parameters  change  slowly, so these tables are comparable  to similar  tables summarizing 
the structure  of fixed-parameter  linear  models  estimated  by myself  and  others.  In general, 
actual  historical  forecast  errors  many  periods  ahead  behave  quite  differently  from  what  is 
implied  by taking  current  parameter  estimates  as known  exactly, whether  one uses fixed 
or varying  parameter  models. CZ  - 
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what a monetarist  would predict:  a substantial  temporary  response in 
output  and  a more  slowly developing,  more  persistent  response  in  prices. 
As has recently been documented in my own work and that of 
Litterman  and Weiss, among  others, this pattern  disappears  in systems 
that include an interest rate.  19 Table 1 also shows the decompositions 
for a six-variable  system that adds the three-month  Treasury  bill rate 
and federal government  expenditures  and revenues. Here it is shown 
that  much  of the variance  in MI can be accounted  for by disturbances  to 
the interest rate and much of the variance  of GNP is now attributed  to 
the interest  rate and federal  revenues, with substantial  reduction  in the 
share attributed  to MI. Figure 2 shows that the responses of MI itself 
and of GNP to disturbances  in MI are weaker in the system with an 
interest  rate, though  price responses are strengthened.  Figure  3 shows 
that simultaneous  downward movements in MI and GNP emerge as 
responses to interest  rate disturbances  in the larger  system.20 
The arguments  given above against  making  too much  of the explana- 
tory power of variables determined  in financial  markets apply to the 
interest  rate  with full  force. The fact that  one finds  that  it is precisely  the 
part  of MI that is predictable  in advance  from  knowledge  of the interest 
rate that is most strongly  connected with real activity does, however, 
seem to be inconsistent with simple rational expectations monetarist 
models  that  imply  only the unpredictable  part  of the money stock affects 
real  activity. Also, it was shown above that MI can behave as if it were 
directly determined  in financial  markets if the monetary authority is 
passive. The fact that the interest  rate absorbs  explanatory  power from 
MI is consistent with the view that MI behaves as Granger  causally 
prior  in systems including  no other  financial  variables  because it acts as 
a kind  of proxy financial  variable. 
One interpretation  of these results might  be as follows. Suppose the 
monetary  authority  exerts tight control in the short run over interest 
rates but cannot influence  MI except indirectly  through  those rates.21 
19. Christopher  A. Sims, "Comparison  of Interwar  and Postwar Business Cycles: 
Monetarism Reconsidered,"  American Economic Review, vol. 70 (May 1980, Papers and 
Proceedings, 1979), pp. 250-57 and "International  Evidence on Monetary  Factors in 
Macroeconomic  Fluctuations,"  Discussion Paper  (University  of Minnesota, 1980);  and 
Robert  B. Litterman  and Laurence  Weiss, "Money, Real Interest  Rates, and Output," 
Working  Paper  179  (Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Minneapolis,  1981). 
20. The appendix  provides  a formal  explanation  of the figures. 
21. This possibility was suggested to me in a private conversation with Robert 
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Suppose further that the response to interest rate disturbances  is as 
displayed  in figure  2. Then monetary  policy has large  but slow effects on 
real GNP and Ml. Monetary  policy is effective, but the authority  has 
little control over the disturbances to the Ml  equation. Instead the 
authority  produces  predictable  smooth  swings  in  M1  over several  months 
by influencing  the interest rate. Because of the shape of the responses 
to interest  rate  disturbances,  it can be shown that  it will be impossible  to 
offset short-run  disturbances  in MI or real  GNP via manipulation  of the 
interest  rate. Attempts  to do so will lead to what is known  as instrument 
instability-explosive  oscillations in the interest rate that can only be 
damped  at the cost of large  oscillations  in MI and  GNP. This view could 
explain a historical  pattern  in which the monetary  authority  stabilized 
interest  rates, at least in the short  run,  and thus why money stock might 
move mainly  in response  to demand.  As in the example  above, this could 
generate  statistical  exogeneity of the money stock. This view would  also 
explain why attempts to stabilize the path of the money stock have 
coincided  with large  movements in the interest  rate and large short-run 
oscillations in GNP and MI. But though this view is appealing  as a 
working  hypothesis  to suggest  further  research,  it is not the only way to 
look at the data. One does not know how much of the historically 
observed  disturbances  in  interest  rates  can  be attributed  to policy choice. 
The recent change in the volatility in interest rates might stem from 
changes  in the structure  of nonpolicy  disturbances. 
Thus  the theoretical  model and empirical  results  under  discussion do 
not, unfortunately,  lead to any simple resolution  of the main disputed 
points in macroeconomics. As has been shown, a passive monetary 
authority  would create behavior in the money stock that would make 
money seem exogenous and make it appear  to explain prices and real 
activity. But the same result  would  emerge  if the money stock did  in fact 
explain real activity and the monetary authority moved it  around 
erratically. 
Policy Evaluation When the Structure is Unknown 
Even to project  the effects of policy choices, not to speak of arriving 
at  the  best  choice, one must  resolve  the  uncertainty  about  which  variables 
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reflects  those choices. The time-series  data will not resolve the uncer- 
tainty on their own. One will have to make  judgments  on the basis of 
common sense and evidence other than time series. This process is 
vulnerable  to prejudice,  and its results will inevitably  be controversial. 
More or less objective statistical analysis of the time-series data can 
nonetheless  play an important  role. 
The U.S. postwar data contain enough information  to give a useful 
characterization  of the conditional  distribution  of the future of major 
macroeconomic  aggregates  given the past. Although  there is evidence 
that  this structure  changes over time, there is also evidence that it does 
not change suddenly, so that a model fit to the whole postwar  period  as 
if parameters  were fixed over that whole period is not badly biased 
because of parameter  changes. This means that, while there is much 
room  forjudgment  and  prejudice  in the choice of macroeconomic  policy, 
careful  attention  to the historical  data  exerts an important  discipline  on 
what can be plausibly  asserted about the way the economy works. The 
discipline  should be applied  in two ways. Those with a particular  view 
about  the way the economy works should  construct  their  policy recom- 
mendations  using an econometric  framework  that limits the exercise of 
prejudice  and informal  reasoning  to areas in which the data are in fact 
uninformative.  In sorting  out the claims  of different  policymakers  about 
the likely effects of their proposals, projections of policies and their 
effects should  be checked  for plausibility  against  predictive  distributions 
derived  from  the data. 
This may sound like a modest and uncontroversial  set of standards 
for policy debate, but it does run  counter  to some views. It is sometimes 
claimed that the probabilistic  structure  of the economy is so unstable 
that there is  no point in econometric evaluation of policy. This is 
sometimes seen,  I  think, as  an implication of  Lucas's critique of 
econometric  policy evaluation  and of the fact that econometric  models 
have  in recent  years  made  forecast  errors  that  have  been  large  in absolute 
terms.22  But Lucas's critique implies only that if policy rules change 
often the structure  will also shift often. As I have argued  above, policy 
rules in the relevant sense of that term have not changed  frequently  or 
by large  amounts.  The large  forecast errors  of recent years do not seem 
to be attributable  mainly  to shifts  in  the structure  of predictive  equations. 
22. Lucas, "Econometric  Policy Evaluation." Christopher A. Sims  139 
Statistical  models allowing  for drift  in predictive  structure  estimate  best 
when the change  in that structure  is assumed  to be slow, so that recent 
large predictive errors are interpreted  as large random  shocks to the 
equations,  not mainly  as the effect of parameter  changes. 
Another  view that  conflicts  with  what  is proposed  here  is the idea  that 
economists should  focus their  attention  on choice of rule  and that since 
the rule change will shift the structure,  projections  using the existing 
probabilistic  structure  are beside the point. Again, as I have argued 
above, disputes  about  the optimal  rule  are  no more  important  in principle 
than  disputes  about  how to implement  the existing "rule" as it emerges 
from existing institutions  and interests. Nonetheless, even when con- 
fronting  economists  who insist that  the rule  ought  to be changed  and  that 
their proposed actions are part of a change in rule, one should use the 
existing probabilistic  structure  to evaluate such proposals. Precisely 
because  those vying  for control  of policy will  propose  to make  permanent 
changes  in the rule much  more often than  they will succeed in doing so, 
the public is likely to discount their rhetoric and react to the actual 
course they set for policy as if it were a disturbance  to the existing 
probabilistic  structure.  If those proposing  the change  in rule succeed in 
implementing  it for some years, and if they have not been similarly 
successful in the past, the statistical model will give little reliable 
information  about the effects of their  persistent  success. But the imme- 
diate  consequences of the proposed  course of action  for the next two or 
three years, as projected  from the existing probabilistic  structure,  are 
likely to be much more reliably  determined  and deserve to be weighed 
carefully  against  the uncertain  claims  of long-term  gains. 
When  a policy projection  emerges  as implausible  in projections  using 
the historical probability structure, there are at least three possible 
interpretations.  The obvious one is that the proposed  policy actions are 
unlikely  to have the claimed  effects. Another  is that  the proposed  actions 
are  very different  from  what  has been done under  similar  circumstances 
in the past. A third is that the proposed paths of policy variables are 
probably  not attainable.  Determining  which of these interpretations  is 
correct  requires  partial  identification  of the model-an  interpretation  of 
it that  explains  how policy actions  affect  its disturbances.  The data  alone 
cannot  produce  behavioral  interpretations,  but  they can, by locating  the 
source  of improbability  in one variable  or another,  help to decide which 
interpretations  are plausible.  Furthermore,  even if it is claimed  that the 140  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
only reason a proposed course of policy action appears  implausible  is 
that  it represents  a deliberate  break  with past patterns  of policy choice, 
it is reasonable  to take the implausibility  as at least one strike  against  the 
proposal.  A policy choice very different  from what the historical  prob- 
ability structure  predicts will have consequences that are difficult to 
predict.  This will occur not only because of adjustment  of expectational 
mechanisms  but also because any use of a statistical model to make 
projections from conditions unlike those observed in the historical 
sample  is subject  to large  errors  in sampling  and specification. 
The practical implications of the view put forward here are best 
illustrated  by an example  of the proposed  type of analysis. Consider  the 
results from estimating  the probability  structure  of the U.S. quarterly 
postwar  data for six variables:  MI, the three-month  Treasury  bill rate, 
real GNP, the GNP deflator, federal government expenditures, and 
federal  government  revenues. 
A linear  vector autoregressive  model was fitted  to the data, allowing 
for parameter  drift  and beginning  from a fairly  loose Bayesian prior  on 
the parameters.23 
The model can be written  as 
6 
Xt+1=  Bt(s)Xt_s +  et,. 
s =o0 
The next period's  vector of data,  X,+  1, is determined  by current  and  past 
data;  by the current  coefficient  matrices,  Bt(s); and by an unpredictable 
innovation,  et+1. The model assumes that data more than six quarters 
old are  not relevant  to the determination  of X,+  1.  The coefficient  matrices 
themselves  drift  over time, following  a random  walk: 
Bt(s) = Bt-I(s)  +  Vt(s)  s  = 0 . . . 6. 
Even if one knew Bt(s) precisely  at time t, X?+ I could not be forecast 
perfectly  because e,+  ?  is not predictable  from knowledge  of current  and 
past  X and current  B. But Bt(s) is not known  precisely, at time t or even 
after the event. Since the B parameters  change over time, it is not the 
23. The time variation  in the parameters  is the methodological  novelty here. In other 
respects  the approach  is similar  to that used in my "Macroeconomics  and Reality," and 
in Stanley  Fischer's "Relative  Shocks, Relative  Price  Variability,  and  Inflation,"  BPEA, 
2:1981, pp. 381-431. A more detailed  description  of the technique  used here is available 
from  the author  in a technical  appendix. Christopher A. Sims  141 
case, as it would  be with  fixed  parameters,  that  a sufficiently  long sample 
period would enable one to estimate B  with an arbitrary  degree of 
precision.  Even if certain  knowledge  of B, - I  (s) were  available,  one would 
only be able to estimate B,(s)  approximately  because of the random 
innovation,  V,(s). 
It  is as  sumed  that  V,(s)  is uncorrelated  with  e, for  all  s. Both  innovations 
are  by construction  serially  uncorrelated.  This assumption  allows appli- 
cation  of the technique  known  as the Kalman  filter  to form 
G,(s) = E[B,(s) I  X(u), u =  1 . . .t], 
the best estimate  of the current  value of the parameter  vector available 
at time t by a convenient recursive formula.24  The formula  generates 
G,(s) from G,_  I(s) and X(t); it can be applied  period by period through 
the sample  at reasonable  computational  cost. The Kalman  filter  requires 
outside  information  on the covariance  matrices  of V  and  e to decompose 
its error  in forecasting  X(t) with t  -  1 information  into X error  and B 
drift.  The greater  is the variance  of unpredictable  X innovations  relative 
to parameter  changes, the less the filter  will change its estimate of B in 
response  to a forecast error. 
To apply  the Kalman  filter  it is necessary to have a previous  estimate 
of the  B,(s) parameters  for the beginning  of the sample  period,  which  can 
then be modified  by subsequent data. The prior was chosen to make 
each variable  on the X vector an independent  random  walk. It is also 
necessary  to specify the covariance  matrices  for the prior,  for V, and  for 
e. This was done by means of a somewhat  unsystematic  grid search to 
determine  the most likely degree of variation  in the parameters.  The 
criterion  used in the search was the sum of squares of the recursive 
residuals-one-step forecast errors  from  the model estimated  with data 
only up through  the time of the forecast. While the grid  for this search 
was not  fine  enough  to produce  precise  answers,  the best fit  was obtained 
with a model in which the standard  error  of the change  in an individual 
parameter  over the whole sample period was about two-tenths of a 
percent. Because the model has many coefficients (six lags on each of 
six variables in each equation), this is enough parameter  variation  to 
affect  the probability  structure  of the model, with one-half  to two-thirds 
24.  See Ralph Deutsch,  Estimation  Theory (Prentice-Hall,  1965), chap.  12, or A.  C. 
Harvey, Time Series Models (Halsted Press,  1981), chap. 4. 142  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
of one-step-ahead forecast error estimated to be accounted for by 
parameter  variation. Estimates allowing for this degree of parameter 
variation  differ  noticeably, but not by a very large  amount,  from those 
estimated  on the assumption  of no parameter  variation  at all. The degree 
of parameter  variation  is small  enough  that  studying  parameter  variation 
by estimation  using separate subsamples  would not be profitable-the 
sampling  error  would dominate  the estimated  parameter  change. Dou- 
bling or halving the rate of parameter  drift increases prediction  error 
variance  by only about  three  or four  percent. 
When the model estimated from data through 1981:4  is used, one 
obtains the results displayed in table 2. The table also presents the 
administration's  projections  for the same variables.  25 
The administration  proposed  a much slower expansion  of the money 
supply  than  the model  deemed  likely as of 1981:4.26  It also proposed  less 
rapid  growth of both expenditures  and revenues than the model. The 
administration  is more optimistic on both inflation  and real growth, 
especially  on inflation. 
It is interesting  to examine the discrepancies  between the forecasts 
of  the model and those of  the administration,  based on  historical 
experience  with forecast  errors  from  the model. Because this model  was 
estimated  recursively,  it was not too difficult  to generate  a complete set 
of forecast errors 1 through 12-steps ahead for it for each date in the 
sample. The covariance matrix  of these historical  forecast errors  then 
provides  a standard  against  which to measure  the gap  between  forecasts 
by the administration  and the model.27  A natural  way to display the 
25.  Projections were obtained from the Economic  Report of the President,  Februaty 
1982, and from the Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the President's Budgetaty 
Proposals for Fiscal  Year 1983 (Government Printing Office, 1982). 
26. The fourth  quarter  of 1981  showed a sharp  drop in the interest  rate, which the 
model had not predicted.  This large  forecast error  shifted  the parameters  of the model 
quite  substantially  in the direction  of producing  a lower  level of interest  rates  and  a higher 
trend  growth  rate  of the money stock in the forecast. An early version  of this paper  used 
parameters  estimated  through  1981:3  in the time-series  model.  That  model  projected  MI 
growth  and inflation  very similar  to that projected  by the administration,  but was much 
less optimistic  about real growth than the administration.  However, for exercises like 
those in table  4, in which  the administration's  projected  paths  for  policy  variables  or  target 
variables  are imposed  on the time-series  model,  results  are similar  in both  versions  of the 
model. 
27. This method does not use the assumed probability  structure  of the model to 
generate forecast error covariances for reasons of computational  convenience. The 
procedure  used does have the advantage  that it gives a reliable  picture  of the model's 
forecasting  properties  even if the model  is misspecified,  so long  as those properties  show 
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Table 2.  Alternative  Forecasts for Selected Economic Indicators, 1982-84 
Percent unless  otherwise  specified 
Pr  ojected  variable 
Three-Feea  Deit 
month  Federal  Federal  (bllions 
Ti-easui-y  GNP  Real  expendi-  deve  of 
Forecast  and year  Mla  bill rateb  deflatora  GNPa  tuirescd  nuesc  dollasS)d 
Autoregressive 
time-series 
1982  9.3  11.7  8.7  2.8  16.2  5.9  136 
1983  8.8  11.6  8.2  4.1  16.3  14.9  170 
1984  8.6  12.3  8.9  3.0  12.6  14.3  177 
Administration 
1982  4.6  11.7  7.2  3.0  9.9  4.5  95 
1983  4.3  10.5  5.5  5.2  4.4  6.1  88 
Source:  Autoregressive  time-series  forecast-same as table 1;  administration's  forecast-The Bludget  of the Unzited 
States  Gover  nmient, Fiscal  Year 1983. 
a. Change  from  fourth  quarter  to fourth  quarter.  The Ml variable  refers  to MI  B spliced  to Ml for periods  before 
MIB is available.  Real GNP is GNP in 1972  dollars. 
b. Calendar  year  average. 
c. Change  from  fourth  quarter  of the preceding  year to third  quarter  of the current  year. 
d. National  income  accounts  budget  figures.  When  the administration's  projections  are used, they are applied  to 
fiscal  year averages  of national  income  accounts  budget  figures  as percent  changes,  although  the projections  were 
originally  prepared  for the unified  budget.  This also accounts  for discrepancies  in the deficit  projections  shown  that 
are national  income accounts deficits derived by applying  administration  projections  of percentage  changes in 
expenditures  and revenues  to the national  income  accounts  versions  of those figures. 
measure  is to order  the variables  and then express the forecast error  in 
variable  j at the tth step ahead as the sum of a "shock,'  u;,, and the 
regression  of the forecast error  on uj,  for earlier  dates or the same date 
for the j  earlier in the ordering. These uj, can be thought of as the 
components  of the t-step  forecast  error,  which  would be "news" t steps 
ahead,  compared  to the parts  that  would  already  have  been revised  based 
on information  arriving  in step 1 through  step t -  1 ahead. Each uj,  is 
normalized  to have a unit equal to its own standard  deviation. Table 3 
shows an analysis of  the discrepancy between the model and the 
administration's  forecasts  using  this decomposition.  Many  different  sets 
of uj,'s  could generate the administration's  forecast; the table displays 
that  set which does so with minimum  sum of squares. 
The disturbances  shown in table 3 are quite small;  none of them are 
as large  as two standard  deviations, and  only three  exceed one standard 
deviation. The decreasing size of the disturbances  necessary to match 
the administration's  forecast, as  the forecast horizon increases, is 
consistent  with  the presence  of parameter  drift  during  the sample  period. 
Disturbances  like those displayed  in the top half  of table  3 are  well within 
the expected range  of deviations  from the model forecast as measured 
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Table 3.  Standardized  Disturbances  Required  to Generate  the Administration's 
Forecast  from  the Autoregressive  Time-Series  Model,  1982:1  through  1983:4a 
Disturbance 
Three- 
month  Federal 
Forecast  Treasury  expendi-  Federal  GNP  Real 
and period  Ml  bill rate  tures  revenues  deflator  GNP 
Administration's 
forecast 
1982:1  -  1.4  0.1  -  0.8  0.6  -  0.8  1.0 
1982:2  -  1.2  0.2  -0.5  0.3  -0.2  0.6 
1982:3  -0.7  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.0  0.5 
1982:4  -0.3  0.2  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.7 
1983:1  -0.1  0.2  0.0  0.4  0.1  0.7 
1983:2  -0.2  0.2  -  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.5 
1983:3  -0.2  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.4 
1983:4  -0.2  0.1  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.3 
Administration's  fore- 
cast for output and 
inflation onlyb 
1982:1  0.1  -  1.1  0.5  -0.6  ...  ... 
1982:2  0.0  -0.9  0.2  -0.2  ...  ... 
1982:3  -0.2  -  0.4  0.5  0.1  ...  ... 
1982:4  -0.5  -0.2  0.5  -0.3  ...  ... 
1983:1  -  0.5  -  0.2  0.6  -  0.5  ...  ... 
1983:2  -0.2  0.0  0.3  -0.2  ...  . 
1983:3  -  0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.2  ...  ... 
1983:4  0.0  0.1  0.0  -  0.1  ...  ... 
Source:  Simulations  by the author. 
a.  Entries show  the set of disturbances  (with size normalized to have a unit equal to their own standard deviation) 
that generate  the administration's  forecast  with the minimum sum of squares of the recursive  residuals. 
b.  With no disturbances  to GNP and inflation equations. 
Taking  into account 1984, there are seventy-two disturbances,  and 
their sum of squares is only 9.9. However, the persistent signs of the 
disturbances  suggest  a systematic  bias in the administration's  forecasts. 
Under a normality  assumption, the probability  of a sequence of four 
positive errors  in real GNP forecasts, each of which is at least as large 
as the corresponding  one of the first four positive shocks on the real 
GNP column  in the top half  of table 3, is about  three-tenths  of a percent. 
Furthermore,  this  bias  appears  to be an  optimistic  one. The  probability 
of an outcome showing at least as much real growth  as the administra- 
tion's forecast while maintaining  at least as low a money-growth  path 
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of an outcome  with sum  of squared  forecast  disturbances  9.9 or more. A 
heuristic  "plausibility  index" (PI)  for a projection,  designed  to show the 
probability  of all  outcomes  that  are  further  away  from  the  central  forecast 
than  the projection  in the same direction,  is the probability  of a normal 
random  variable  exceeding the square  root of the sum of squares  of the 
disturbances  required  to fit  the projection.  The administration's  forecast 
has a PI of 0.0008. 
The implausibility  of the administration's  forecast, as far  as the model 
is concerned, concentrates  on MI and real GNP. Money growth  as low 
and real GNP growth  as high as projected  are quite unlikely, at least as 
a combination. The first two rows of table 4 show what the model 
produces  as the most likely outcome for real GNP and inflation  condi- 
tional on the administration  forecasts for MI, interest rates, and the 
fiscal variables  being realized. The model's inflation  forecasts are then 
as low as those of the administration  but  the model's real  GNP forecasts 
are far more pessimistic. A table analogous to table 3, showing the 
forecast disturbances  needed to generate the table 4 projections (not 
shown) would be very similar  to table 3 except the last two columns. 
One might have expected the money forecast to have appeared  much 
more plausible  with the GNP forecast not imposed, but in fact it does 
not turn  out that way. Leaving the inflation  and real GNP forecasts out 
of the projection  raises the PI to 0.01 1-still  a low figure,  but  the original 
PI was smaller  by a factor  of 0.07. 
The results of using the model to generate the administration's  real 
GNP and inflation  forecasts through  disturbances  in only MI, interest 
rates, and fiscal variables  are reported  in the third  and fourth rows of 
table  4. The GNP and  inflation  forecasts  imply  a moderate  monetary  and 
tremendous  fiscal stimulus. The bottom half of table 3 shows that the 
model  does not view these policy settings  as extremely  unlikely,  though 
again  they require  patterns  of sustained  shocks that  are less likely when 
their signs are taken into account. A  succession of four negative 
disturbances  in the interest  rate  forecast, each  as large  as the correspond- 
ing entry  in the bottom  half of table 3, has a probability  under  normality 
of only about  four-tenths  of a percent.  The PI for this projection  is 0.013, 
roughly  the same as for the administration's  projected  setting  of policy 
variables. 
In an experiment  not shown in the tables the model was checked for 
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Table 4.  Projections  from the Autoregressive  Time-Series  Model When Constrained 
to Match Alternative  Features of the Administration's  Forecast, 1982-83 
Percent unless otherwise  specified 
Pr  ojected var-iablea 
Thrt  ee- 
mnonith Federal  Deficit 
Characteristic  of  GNP  Real  Treasuiry expendi-  Federatl  (billions 
projection  and year  deflator  GNP  Ml  bill rate  tures  revenues of dollars) 
Constrained  to match 
forecast  for Ml, 
three-month 
Treasury  bill rate, 
and  fiscal variablesb 
1982  6.7  - 1.0  (4.6)  (11.7)  (9.9)  (4.5)  (95) 
1983  5.7  0.4  (4.3)  (10.5)  (4.4)  (6.1)  (88) 
Constrained  to match 
administration's 
forecast  for output 
and inflationc 
1,982  (7.2)  (3.0)  10.2  10.7  20.3  0.8  177 
1983  (5.5)  (5.2)  9.9  10.1  25.2  5.6  389 
Constrained  to match 
administration's 
forecast  for Mld 
1982  9.1  -0.4  (4.6)  15.4  13.0  8.7  90 
1983  8.6  -2.5  (4.3)  13.6  9.2  7.0  116 
Source:  Same as table 2. 
a.  The administration's forecasts  are in parentheses.  See  also  notes  to tables 2 and 3. 
b.  All equations  in the system  reflect variables undergoing disturbances. 
c.  With disturbances  to equations  for Ml,  three-month Treasury bill rate, and fiscal variables. 
d.  With disturbances  to the three-month Treasury bill rate equation only. 
real  GNP to be realized.  These target  forecasts in themselves emerge  as 
not terribly  unlikely, as would be expected from the relatively small 
discrepancies  between the unconstrained  forecast and the administra- 
tion's projections  shown in table 2 for these two target variables. The 
largest  disturbance  required  is only 0.39 standard  errors, though there 
are a succession of disturbances  of this size of the same (negative)  sign 
required  in the price forecasts. The PI for this projection  is 0.10. The 
outcome for real  growth  and inflation  projected  by the administration  is 
not itself extremely implausible;  it is this outcome conjoined with the 
projected  path of policy variables  that conflicts with historical  experi- 
ence. 
The experiments  up to this point treat MI, interest rate, and fiscal 
variables  as "policy variables." It is unlikely  that  policy authorities  can 
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one could explore assuming that some of the projections for these 
variables  will have to be abandoned.  As one example, one can ask what 
the model predicts  if only the administration's  money forecast must be 
fulfilled,  and interest  rates are used by the administration  to achieve the 
money target. The results are shown in the last two rows of table 4. 
Persistently  high  interest  rates are required,  producing  declining  output 
and  little improvement  in inflation.  The initial  forecast disturbance  (for 
1982:1)  to interest rates is 4.6 standard  deviations, so this outcome 
appears  highly  unlikely. The fact that such persistent  inflation  is shown 
in  the  face of such  a gloomy  output  forecast  suggests  that  treating  interest 
rate disturbances  as determined  by policy might  be a mistake. Interest 
rate  increases  may at times have anticipated  adverse supply  shocks that 
raise  the price  level. The model  may  therefore  associate  them  with more 
subsequent  inflation  than would actually occur if they were generated 
by policy action in the absence of a supply  shock. 
The projections for the time-series model in which either money 
growth  or  price  and  GNP  growth  were unconstrained,  with  the exception 
of table  4, show a slow upward  drift  in velocity-the  sum  of growth  rates 
in output  and prices is close to or slightly  higher  than  the growth  rate of 
the money stock. The administration's  forecast requires  that velocity 
grow  much  faster, by roughly  5.6 percent  in 1982  and  6.4 percent  in 1983. 
The forecast in which the slow money growth is generated  by interest 
rate  disturbances  generates  a rapid  increase  in velocity, mainly  in 1982, 
but does so by an understandable  mechanism-very high  interest  rates. 
That history gives no good reason to suppose one will find a rapid 
increase in velocity in a period of stable or declining  interest rates has 
been pointed out before, for example, by the Congressional  Budget 
Office.28 
The analysis  carried  out here makes  the case that  the administration's 
forecast  is implausible.  It also gives some insight  into  what  is implausible 
about it. But in the discussion the two central difficulties  with such 
analysis have not been touched upon-the  identification  problem  and 
the problem  of extrapolating  a model under  unprecedented  conditions. 
The four potential "policy variables"  in the system, MI, interest rate, 
expenditures,  and  revenues, behave  as if they are  predetermined.  There 
is little evidence of strong  feedback from target  variables  to these four 
28.  Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the President's Budgetaty Proposals. 148  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1982 
variables.29  But it has already  been shown that policy variables, espe- 
cially monetary  policy variables, could behave this way even if they 
have moved mainly  passively in the historical  data. 
If policy actions have in fact had little influence  on MI and interest 
rates historically,  and if from 1982  on policy will exert strong  influence 
on them, the projections  of the model  could  be misleading.  If historically 
these variables  have been influenced  both  by policy and  by other  factors, 
the model  will make  conditional  projections  that  average  the "response" 
to policy actions and  the response  following  other sources of movement 
in MI and interest rate. However, in this case there would be great 
uncertainty  surrounding  the system's response in the sample period, 
which should  show up in large  forecast  error  variances.  If one concedes 
that,  policy-induced  periods of tight and easy money are a substantial 
part of the historical  record, the implausibility  of the administration's 
projection  for  real  GNP  and  inflation  given  the  policy  variable  projections 
should  be convincing  evidence that the proposed  policy is not likely to 
have the intended  effects. 
The projections  for policy variables  are in themselves implausible, 
however. As discussed above, this raises questions  about  the reliability 
of the model in forecasting  the consequences of policy actions putting 
these variables  on the projected  paths. The implausibility  does not arise 
from the size of any one shock being outside the historically  recorded 
range, but rather from sequences of shocks of the same sign being 
required.  This is the kind  of disturbance  to policy about which rational 
expectations warns us to be suspicious. If periods of sustained  below- 
prediction  money growth  have occurred  before, one could in principle 
use a model  that  systematically  adapts  its forecasting  mechanism  to such 
periods.  The model under  consideration  does not do this. It attempts  to 
avoid large errors  by adapting  its linear  forecasting  structure  to recent 
history. The administration's  long-term  policy of steady reduction in 
money growth  may not yet be reflected  well in the model's coefficients. 
This being said, however, the question is whether  there is reason to 
suspect anything  systematically  wrong  with model  projections-that is, 
29. Such feedback would have showed up, for example, in a substantial  difference 
between  the disturbances  in the first  four  columns  of the top half  of table  3 and  those in the 
same four columns  of a similar  table (not shown)  computed  for the first  two rows of the 
table  4 forecast.  Such  a table  is not provided  because  it differs  little  from  table  3 in the first 
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is there  a priori  knowledge  that  would allow one to correct  the model?  I 
doubt  that there is any professional  consensus on such knowledge,  but 
there are some hypotheses among economists that suggest systematic 
corrections,  most notably  rational  expectations  combined  with a mone- 
tarist  view of business cycles. This view would suggest that sustained 
dampening  of money growth will eventually be understood  as a firm, 
long-run  policy; that when it is understood, expectations of inflation, 
and  thereby  actual  inflation  and nominal  interest  rates, will fall without 
the need for mediating  movements  in real variables.  As far as I can see, 
such  a view does little  to make  the administration's  forecast  appear  more 
plausible.  A neoclassical, rational  expectations  world view can explain 
why nominal interest rates, inflation, and money growth could all 
decrease at the same time. It does not suggest that, with inflation  and 
interest rates declining, velocity shoula increase; most models along 
that  line would suggest  the opposite, that  to the extent that  interest  rates 
affect velocity, declines in interest rates should reduce velocity. If the 
administration  believed  that  announcement  of its monetary  policy inten- 
tions would bring  inflation  down only at the moderate  rate given in its 
forecast,  it should  not have projected  such  high  real  growth.  A projection 
of much  more  rapid  deceleration  in inflation  would  have been even more 
implausible  from the point of view of the model, but would have been 
defensible  on the assumption  of strong  and  rapid  announcement  effects. 
The results give no support to the idea that the administration's 
projection  represents  an  unprecedented  fiscal  policy. In  fact, the top half 
of table 3 shows that the forecast disturbances  in expenditures  are all 
less than  one standard  error,  and they do not form  a sequence of values 
with the same sign. The projected  revenues are higher  than the model 
expects, even given the administration's  real  GNP  forecast. The tax cuts 
thus  represent  no unusual  fiscal stimulus. 
The same issues of identification  and reliability  of the model under 
unusual  policy paths cast doubt on the wisdom of attempting  to aim at 
the policy variable  paths shown in the third  and fourth  rows of table 4. 
It is doubtful  that policy can hold interest  rates down below 11  percent 
while  the deficit  explodes as in that  table. The 1984  forecast (not shown) 
for  that  part  of the table has inflation  jumping  back  up to 8.5 percent  and 
real  growth  dropping  back to 4 percent.  To keep inflation  down and real 
growth  up beyond 1983  would probably  require  a still more  implausible 
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reason  to suppose  that  continued  large  deficits  would  refuel  and  acceler- 
ate inflation. 
The forecast of table 2 seems to me both plausible  and desirable:  a 
moderately  declining  rate  of growth  in the money stock, flat  interest  rate 
path, revenues starting  to catch up with expenditures  in 1984, modest 
but fairly steady GNP growth, and steady and moderate inflation. 
Reasonable  debate might  surround  the question  of whether  some more 
overt deflationary  pressure would be  desirable-by  modest moves 
toward fiscal and monetary  restriction  that are different  from what is 
shown  in table 2. There is also the question  of whether  the substance  of 
the expenditure  increases  justifies their  cost. Such a reasonable  debate, 
conditioned  by historical  experience, should  be possible and  in my view 
is not far from what was actually achieved with the sensible use of 
econometric  models in much  of the postwar  period. 
Conclusion 
The procedures  used above are in a way only marginal  modifications 
of the conventional use  of  econometric models in macroeconomic 
policymaking.  They do involve making  projections  of the likely effects 
of various paths for policy variables and using the plausibility and 
desirability  of those projections  to evaluate  the policy proposals,  which 
is a common procedure.  They differ  from the usual procedures  in two 
respects: they take account of  policy endogeneity and they avoid 
constructing  behavioral stories about each individual  equation in the 
model. 
They take account of policy endogeneity by generating  true condi- 
tional  projections,  given specified  paths for policy variables.  The usual 
procedure assumes that the  specified path for a policy variable is 
generated  by disturbances  to the policy equation, with all other distur- 
bances held at zero. With endogenous policy, this is a potentially 
misleading  way to generate  projections. 
The procedures also follow the lead of the rational expectations 
approach  to macroeconomics  because they use a statistical  model that 
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by claiming to have useful knowledge that allows restrictions to be 
placed  on the model one equation  at a time.30 
These technical differences from standard  procedures are not the 
main  point of the policy evaluation  examples  or of this paper.  The main 
point is that careful statistical modeling of the historical probability 
structure  can properly  be used to make  conditional  projections  that will 
be useful in policy analysis. The ambitious,  probably  unattainable  goal 
of the rational  expectations school-to  identify  parameters  of behavior 
that would be invariant  to unprecedented  permanent  changes in rule- 
should  not condition an entire research  plan. We should be improving 
our methods for estimating and using statistical models that do not 
require identifying such parameters. Most policy analysis does not 
require  that kind  of identification. 
APPENDIX 
Notes  to the Figures 
THE  MODELS  underlying  the figures  have the form 
B,(L)Y(t) =  u(t), 
where  B, is a matrix  polynomial  in the lag operator  with lead coefficient 
Bto =  I, the identity matrix. The residual  vector, u, is assumed to be 
uncorrelated  with Y(s)  for s < t. The model for evolution of Bt assumes 
that each of its coefficients is a random  walk and that the best estimate 
of future Bt is the same as the best estimate of the current Bt. The 
dynamics  implied  by B, are easier to understand  by examining  Bt  I(L) 
than  by looking at Bt(L)  itself. To see why, suppose that at time t there 
is a forecast  from the model of Y(t + s) for s > 0 based on data  through 
time t. One then asks what change in the forecast will result if some 
nonzero  equation  disturbance  is assumed  at t + 1, u(t + 1) = v. It is not 
30. This  aspect  of the rational  expectations  movement  is given  particular  emphasis  by 
Robert  E. Lucas in the introduction  to his book, Studies  in Business-Cycle  Thleoty (MIT 
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hard  to check that  the modification  in the forecast at t + s is G,sv,  where 
G,(L)  =  B,-  (L).  More  generally,  given  an arbitrary set  of  assumed 
values for the disturbances, u(t + s), s =  1,.  . . , the implied modification 
of the forecast at t + s is given by G,(L)u(t  + s), where in applying  this 
formula  one takes u(t + s) to be zero for nonpositive  s. Thus  the inverse 
of B,(L)  can be thought  of as summarizing  how the system responds  to 
equation  disturbances.  The original  B, contains the same information 
but in less comprehensible  form. Typically the elements of B, are lag 
distributions  with oscillatory or erratically  varying  weights whose im- 
plications  for the system's dynamics  are hard  to unravel. 
When B, is fixed so the t subscript  is unnecessary, all the system's 
dynamics  consist of responses to equation shocks. When B, is itself a 
stochastic process, the system also receives a shock by changes in B,. 
With  stochastically  varying  B, therefore,  examination  of B,  - I  can reveal 
only part of the system's dynamics. In the model estimated for this 
paper, the B, are implied to vary slowly, so examination  of B, itself 
captures  a large  part  of the dynamics. 
Each panel of the figures  shows the response to a single  disturbance, 
u(t) =  v, where v is one of the columns of the lower triangular  factori- 
zation,  W, of the variance-covariance  matrix of u,  WW'  =  Var(u(t)), 
with the variables  ordered  in the opposite sequence from the way they 
appear  in the figure-that is, with MI at the top. Thus the charts  can be 
thought of  as displaying responses to  shocks of typical size,  with 
correlations  among  the u(t) being treated  as generated  by responses of 
elements  of u(t)  to disturbances  higher  in the ordering. 
Somewhat inconsistently, the figures take W from the covariance 
matrix of the model's sample recursive residuals-that  is, from the 
sample  covariance  matrix  of actual  errors  one step ahead. Because this 
covariance  matrix  includes the effects of shocks to Bt, it is larger  than 
any  good estimate  of the variance  of u(t),  the equation  disturbances.  Use 
of the recursive residual  covariance matrix  may help bring  the figures 
closer to representing  full-system  dynamics. Comments 
and Discussion 
Stephen M. Goldfeld: Christopher  Sims has presented an interesting 
paper that addresses the important  issue of how one should conduct 
formal policy analysis. Sims observes that the rational expectations 
critique  advanced by Robert Lucas and others has cast a pall over the 
use of econometric  models in policy analysis. As one whose intellectual 
capital was in danger of technological obsolescence, I certainly find 
congenial  Sims's  punch  line  that  the rational  expectations  critique  should 
be viewed as a "cautionary  footnote" to policy analysis. I also like 
Sims's paper  for its thoughtful  discussion of policy endogeneity,  a topic 
that  worried  Alan Blinder  and me some years ago. 
Sims starts out by confronting the paradox of viewing policy as 
"random"  at the same time that one thinks of it as purposeful,  even, 
perhaps in some fairy-tale world, chosen in an optimal way. While 
acknowledging  the valid elements of the Lucas approach,  Sims points 
out that  the rational  expectations  critique  typically  treats  the choice of a 
policy  rule  as if it occurs  de novo each time-that is, by failing  to consider 
the nature  of choices embodied  in historical  data, this line of argument 
ignores  the issue of policy endogeneity. 
As a footnote to Sims's argument,  it has always seemed to me that 
there was a certain asymmetry to the Lucas critique. In particular, 
changes  in policy rules  hardly  tend to occur at random  times. One could 
well imagine  that  changes  in rules  are often brought  about  by changes  in 
the "model," that is, the real world, rather  than the other way around. 
The history of the gold standard  provides a case in point. This sort of 
policy endogeneity suggests a need for rethinking  the rational  expecta- 
tions critique. 
This is precisely what Sims does.  He concludes that policy rule 
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changes  of the sort envisaged in the Lucas critique  are rare  events and 
that conventional  econometric  models can be used sensibly to analyze 
policy changes  in a wide variety  of cases. He does, however, have some 
unkind  words to say about  conventional  models and some nice things  to 
say about  the use of rational  expectations  to improve  existing models. 
This is all so preposterously  reasonable  that  I have little quarrel  with 
it. Nevertheless, while I am delighted to have all this said, I wonder 
whether  it will convince even a quasi-believer  in the strong  form of the 
rational  expectations  critique.  It is, after  all, an empirical  question  as to 
what is a sensible modeling strategy, and Sims provides only limited 
evidence to address this issue. Furthermore,  much of the discussion 
seems to gloss over the distinction between estimation problems and 
policy analysis and I, for one, would have liked a bit of clarification  on 
this score. 
The second part  of Sims's paper  discusses the identification  problem 
in models  with  rational  expectations.  As a general  proposition,  imposing 
rational  expectations on the model seems to make things  worse and, in 
one sense, this should not be very surprising.  About twenty years ago 
the econometrician,  T. C. Liu, argued  that  virtually  all variables  appear- 
ing in econometric  models are endogenous  so that models are generally 
underidentified.  Although  this view has been shown to be a bit mislead- 
ing, it does have relevance for the present case.  In a crude sense, 
replacing  some  ad  hoc expectations  mechanism,  such  as some  distributed 
lag, by rational  expectations might  be thought  of as endogenizing  more 
things;  therefore,  this creates difficulties  in identification. 
Sims actually talks about the identification  problem in a slightly 
different  way. More specifically,  he provides a number  of clever exam- 
ples of models in which there are variables  that appear  predetermined 
and have explanatory  power for variables  we care about such as GNP, 
and yet these predetermined  variables  are passive and have no policy 
significance.  As he readily  acknowledges, these examples suggest that 
caution is needed in using and interpreting  tests for exogeneity-tests 
that Sims himself has pioneered. He illustrates these difficulties by 
examining  two small  multivariate  vector autoregressive  models. In one, 
the money stock appears  to be causally  prior  while in the second model, 
which includes  an interest  rate, this result  no longer  holds. 
Sims also hypothesizes that one view consistent with the data  is that 
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stock indirectly.  But because of the shape of the dynamic  responses of 
the economy to policy, if the Federal Reserve attempts to track the 
money stock too closely, very large fluctuations  in interest rates will 
result.  There is, in fact, some empirical  evidence suggesting  that this is 
a quite  plausible  scenario. More  particularly,  Peter  Tinsley has recently 
examined  the relation  between the variability  of interest rates and the 
variability  of the money stock around  some long-term  target  path. As 
the Federal  Reserve attempts  to return  more rapidly  to the target  path, 
Tinsley  finds  that interest  rate variability  steadily  increases. Moreover, 
if the attempted  gap closing is more than about 30 percent a month, 
actual  monetary  control  is not improved  so there  is no compensation  for 
greater  interest  rate  variability. 
The final part of the Sims paper uses the technique of vector auto- 
regressions  (VAR) to do policy analysis and to analyze the plausibility 
(or  rather  lack thereof)  of the forecasts of the current  administration.  As 
many have observed, it requires a bit of new math to reconcile the 
various  components  of the administration's  forecast. Among  others, the 
forecast has a "velocity problem" because healthy growth  in nominal 
GNP is coupled with an assumed stingy growth  in the monetary  aggre- 
gates. The implied increase in velocity is off the charts by historical 
standards,  even ignoring  the fact that  the  forecast  also contains  a marked 
decline  in interest  rates. By use of the VAR technique,  Sims elaborately 
demonstrates  these same difficulties. Because, as I have suggested, a 
few great  ratios  of economics should  be adequate  to cast serious  doubts 
on the administration's  forecast, for me the main virtue of this part of 
Sims's paper is that it demonstrates  how one can use VAR for policy 
analysis. Nevertheless, even here a few questions  remain. 
As compared  with conventional VAR applications, Sims advances 
the state of the art by allowing for drift in his parameter  estimates. I 
would  have guessed that  this would  be of some quantitative  importance. 
One reason is that there seem to be some dimensional  difficulties  with 
the specifications  in Sims's VAR analysis since he mixes both nominal 
and  real  variables.  Because  the  coefficient  of a nominal  variable  regressed 
on a real variable  might  be expected to reflect  an upward  movement  in 
the price  level, one would think  this might  show up in parameter  drift.  A 
second reason is that, although Sims cautions us against looking at a 
single  equation,  I could not help  but  anticipate  that  the well-documented 
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show up in Sims's estimates. Yet despite these expectations, Sims 
reports  that  parameter  drift  does not appear  to be very consequential.  I 
am not sure I fully understand  or believe this result. Perhaps  it is the 
case that the particular  way Sims chooses to model changing  parame- 
ters-namely,  as a random  walk-is  not sufficiently  rich to capture  the 
kinds of changes which might  have occurred.  Just as Sims has cleverly 
illustrated  in the second part of his paper, I suspect one can construct 
examples of changing  parameters  that are important  and yet trick the 
Sims  approach  into thinking  there  is little change  in the parameters.  This 
strikes  me as worthy  of further  investigation. 
A second set of issues concerns  the interpretation  of the standardized 
disturbances  from the VAR model that form the basis for assessing the 
plausibility  of the administration  forecast. One difficulty  is that these 
estimates are not invariant  to the ordering  of the equations  in the VAR 
model. This is a troublesome  feature  of the VAR approach,  and it would 
be nice to know the sensitivity of the estimates  to the causal ordering. 
It can be argued that a related problem of interpretation  of the 
standardized  disturbances  results from treating  government spending 
and taxes as ordinary  variables  in the VAR approach.  The tax equation 
strikes  me as particularly  problematical  since it makes taxes a function 
of such variables  as lagged  real GNP and the lagged GNP deflator,  but 
nowhere  includes a variable  for legislated  tax rates. What  this means is 
that  we end up  judging  the implausibility  of the administration's  forecast 
partially  on the basis of the implausibility  of estimated  tax revenues, but 
only given real  GNP and  the like. However, it could be argued  that  what 
is most implausible  is the passage of the cuts in tax rates, and it seems 
strange  to ignore  the fact that  this  implausibility,  has  already  taken  place. 
Rather,  it would seem that one should  judge the plausibility  of revenue 
estimates  given tax rates. This strikes  me as a good example  of how the 
nonstructural  VAR approach can run into logical problems in policy 
analysis. Be this as it may, however, Sims certainly  provides a variety 
of evidence reinforcing  the implausibility  of the administration's  fore- 
casts. 
One last point I would like to take up is first mentioned in the 
introduction  to Sims's paper. He begins by suggesting  that it is widely 
believed that econometric models badly misled policymakers  by mis- 
characterizing  the nature of the relation between inflation  and unem- 
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against  this view, put forth  for example  by Lucas and Thomas  Sargent, 
who assert that there has been a "spectacular  failure" of econometric 
models. Having seen the follies of many econometric models at close 
hand, I would hardly go to the wall to defend model performance. 
Nevertheless, I believe this  particular  charge  to be a bit  unjust.  Evidence 
on this point, at least for the MPS model, is contained  in a recent paper 
by Albert  Ando, who shows that  the model  is perfectly  capable  of tracing 
the historical  pattern  of wages and prices for the 1970s  as well as it did 
in the 1960s.  I  This result  is examined  with  various  vintages  of the model, 
and  it suggests  that  those who wish to assert spectacular  failure  had  best 
be a bit more specific. 
In the spirit  of sorting  out paradoxes  that motivate  much  of the Sims 
paper,  I would  like to conclude with a thought  from  an earlier  pioneer  in 
the field of rational  expectations, Aldous Huxley, who observed: "that 
men  do not learn  much  from  the lessons of history  is the most important 
of lessons history  has to teach." 
Jeffrey D.  Sachs: Christopher Sims has written an important and 
challenging  paper  that  grapples  with  one of the central  issues in empirical 
economics: the use of econometric models for policy simulation. In 
many  ways it deals  with  the same  issues taken  up  by Blinder  and  Goldfeld 
ten years ago.2  With  the very rapid  development  in recent years of time- 
series analysis, to which Sims himself  has made major  contributions,  it 
is fitting  that  the Brookings  panel  reconsider  this issue. Much  of the past 
decade's work  in macroeconometrics  has been devoted to showing  how 
badly we can mislead ourselves when performing  standard  simulation 
analyses on macroeconomic  models. It is noteworthy, therefore, that 
Sims ends with almost the same confidence that Blinder  and Goldfeld 
did concerning the feasibility of policy simulation. Unfortunately  he 
himself  gives us enough  reasons to doubt  this confidence. 
The central  issue in policy simulation  is the relation  between corre- 
lation  and  causation.  A macroeconometric  model  summarizes  in a highly 
sophisticated  way the historical correlations  of economic time series. 
Correlation  per se may be enough for forecasting, assuming that the 
1.  Albert Aldo,  "The 'Failure' of Keynesian  Economics  and the Phillips Curve in the 
1970's: A Fact or a Fiction?"  (University  of Pennsylvania,  September 1981). 
2.  Alan  S.  Blinder  and  Stephen  M.  Goldfeld,  "Some  Implications  of  Endogenous 
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future is like the past, and for this reason, the vector autoregression 
model  studied  by Sims is useful  for forecasting  even though  it embodies 
little economic theory. Policy simulation,  however, explicitly assumes 
that  the  future  may  be unlike  the  past, at least  with  regard  to the dynamics 
of the policy variable  itself. In that case we need to know whether the 
historical  correlations  will hold up with policy changes. Sims calls the 
model structural  if the correlations  are invariant  to the policy changes 
under consideration. In this terminology policy simulations will be 
meaningful  only if the estimated  model is structural. 
Consider,  for example, the link between income, Y, and a monetary 
aggregate,  M. It has  been  known  for  a long  time  that  whether  a correlation 
between Y  and M will hold up to policy changes  depends  on how Y  and 
M were generated  in the sample  period.  If M was changed  exogenously, 
say according  to a roll of the dice, then the correlation  would tend to be 
structural,  because one would  be observing  randomized  experiments;  if 
M was changed  because of Y  or because of a common  third  factor that 
also affected Y, the relation  is not likely to withstand  policy changes. 
This much is well known. In 1921, Governor Strong of the Federal 
Reserve System of New York  complained  about  the staff  of his research 
department  for using correlations  to argue "that an increase in bank 
loans and currency  is the inevitable  cause of higher  prices, [while they] 
...  are unwilling  to accept  the view  that sometimes  bank loans  and 
currency  expand in response to prices, which arise from other causes 
than the 'quantity' of money.  .  .  ."  In 1970 James Tobin strengthened 
this case by showing that even if M leads Y-that  is, M is correlated 
with future Y-no  causality is implied. And Sims himself shows in this 
paper that even if M "Granger-causes"  Y-that  is, helps to predict Y 
given past Y-it  need not cause Yin the policy-invariant  sense. Rather, 
M may be correlated  with unobservables  (real productivity  shocks in 
Sims's case), which themselves cause Y. 
To understand  Sims's defense of policy simulation it is useful to 
consider  a specific example. Suppose that the econometrician,  perhaps 
the research  department  of the Federal  Reserve, estimates 
(1)  Y=  a1Yt1  +  boM, +  bjMt_1 +  ClZt_j. 
Suppose  further  that no other lags of M or Y  are statistically  significant 
and  that  the equation  appears  to be well estimated  by the usual  standards 
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the sense that a policy simulation  would yield consistent estimates of Y 
conditional  on M? That depends on the true structure  of the economy 
and on the process that  generated  M in the sample  period. Suppose that 
1 is of the correct  functional  form, 
(2)  Yt =  a,Yt_  +  boMt +  b,Mt_  +  c1Z,_I +  u, 
and  that  policy has been set by 
(3)  Mt =  aoiM,_  +  Pi1  Yt,l  +  y1Zt-I  +  V. 
Estimates  of 2 exist that  will be structural  in the sense used here  under 
two well-known  conditions. Either vt  is uncorrelated  with ut, or cl = 0 
and Zt -1 is uncorrelated  with ut. (In the latter case, Zt -1 is used as an 
instrumental  variable.)  The first  condition  says that  history  has given us 
pure money shocks or randomized  experiments.  The second condition 
states that even if the experiments  are not random  (because they are 
conditional  on Zt), they are  informative  about  the role of money  because 
Z does not directly  affect income. 
Conventional structural  models have traditionally  made such as- 
sumptions  on variables  like Z (that  is, exclusion restrictions).  In Sims's 
vector autoregression  approach  such restrictions  are frowned upon as 
arbitrary,  and indeed they might be. But an even more astounding 
assumption  is then necessarily  made  in order  to use VAR to forecast  the 
effect of policy actions: that vt  and ut  are uncorrelated.  The approach  is 
summarized  as follows: all variables  in the model are allowed to affect 
both M and Y;  all variables  outside the model are captured  by the error 
term  and  are allowed  to affect M or Yonly in an arbitrary  specified  way. 
A terrific weight is carried by the residual if one tries to argue for 
structural  identification  in a VAR. 
This assumption leads to the following conundrum, which Sims 
discusses at length  in the first  part  of the paper:  if M is set purposefully 
by monetary  authorities,  presumably  with some goals in mind,  how can 
we claim that vt is in fact a purely random  outcome? The answer that 
ultimately  emerges is that we cannot. In the second part of the paper 
Sims presents a model that can be interpreted  as showing  that vt and u, 
will be correlated  if the monetary  authority  has had interest  rate targets 
over the sample  period. He offers strong  evidence that  they have in fact 
had  such  targets  when  he shows that  i helps  to predict,  or  Granger-cause, 
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in  which  v,  and  u,  are  in  fact correlated  because  of conscious stabilization 
policy. They showed  the important  and  paradoxical  result  that  the better 
the stabilization,  the smaller  would be the estimated effect of M on Y 
in 1. 
Sims argues  that changes in the policymaker's  goals, say because of 
alternating  political  administrations,  can give the independent  variance 
in  M needed  for statistical  identification.  This argument  is only partially 
correct, because it is fair to assume that the alternating  policymakers 
are still responding  to interest rates or to other variables,  even though 
they have different  feedback rules. Also, the change  in political  admin- 
istration  is at least partially  correlated  with economic events. 
On the point of structural  invariance  then, my reading  is that Sims is 
unconvinced  in his solution  to this vexing problem. 
He is more convincing on a second point, however. Suppose that 
instead  of 2, the true income process is given by a Lucas-Barro  supply 
function: 
(4)  Yt = A1 Yt_  1 + BO(M,-  M,)  +  ut  , 
where Me is expected money, so that income fluctuates according  to 
unanticipated  monetary shocks. Assuming that agents know the eco- 
nomic structure in 4 and the money-supply process of 3, one may 
combine  3 and 4 to obtain  4': 
(4')  Yt =  (A1  -  BOI3)Y,_  -  Bo0o,Mt1  +  BoMt  -  B0yjZt1  +  ut. 
It can be immediately  seen that the links between Y and M depend on 
the monetary  rule  itself. Although  Yt  is in fact independent  of the money- 
supply  rule,  a naive  estimation  of 4' will suggest  otherwise.  The reduced- 
form  estimate, 1, will say nothing  useful about  the effects of a change  in 
money-supply  rule (that is,  a change in (xi, ,1,  Yi) on income. This 
problem  is the famous Lucas critique. 
Sims offers convincing  reasons for doubting  the overwhelming  rele- 
vance of this concern:  policy shifts are likely to be short-lived  given the 
political  system; many  policy announcements  are never carried  out and 
are  likely never believed; large  policy changes  are rare, tinkering  is the 
norm;  true  policies are  never  known, so that  agents  are  always  inevitably 
smoothing  their  estimates  using  recent  history.  And  practically  speaking, 
because discrete changes in regime are not clearly perceived, the 
econometric  task in accounting  for regime  changes  is formidable,  and  in 
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But Sims then oversteps his case by arguing  that  actual  policymaking 
is therefore  merely  selecting  the errors  (such  as v,) in a stable  policy rule 
such as 3. Policy changes do occur, as the current monetary policy 
illustrates.  And even if policy changes  are short-lived,  they are  probably 
not representable  by a random  sequence of drawings  on vt  at quarterly 
intervals. Operationally,  I would wager Sims that out-of-sample  errors 
on the policy equations in his VAR display strong serial correlation  in 
many subperiods, reflecting  short-run  changes in regime. Sims is cer- 
tainly correct that certain  aspects of economic behavior  will be almost 
invariant  to policy change if the change is perceived as short run and 
reversible. (Wage-setting  behavior  and wage outcomes seem to be one 
example.)  But  other  aspects of behavior,  particularly  in  financial  markets 
such as the foreign exchange market,  will react quickly to even short- 
run changes. Generally speaking, the Lucas critique will apply when 
there  is a large  role for expectations, and when technological  or institu- 
tional factors do  not weigh heavily against a  change in operating 
procedures. 
While many may share Sims's judgment  call here, I doubt that one 
may usefully confront the challenge of the Lucas critique by a priori 
judgments.  Sims's  empirical  evidence  on structural  stability  that  I discuss 
below is useful in this regard. But more important, the proposition 
should be tested straight  on. Have widely perceived policy changes, 
such  as the switches  from  fixed  to flexible  exchange  rates  or  from  interest 
rate  to money  targets,  affected  other  structural  relations  in the predicted 
way? This debate simply cannot be settled by assuming  that there has 
been a single  policy regime. 
In the last section of the paper, Sims's preferred  methodological 
approach  is put  on display.  He modifies  a standard  vector  autoregression 
to allow for drift in the coefficients and tests for the plausibility  of the 
Reagan administration's  macro program.  It is ingenious econometric 
work. Sims seems to rely on two principles:  first, it is usually  plausible 
to assume that policy rules will not change, even despite policy pro- 
nouncements  to the contrary;  and second, since there is little reason to 
expect a shift in structure,  one may as well use a VAR for forecasting, 
since it parsimoniously  describes  the relevant  historical  experience. 
To jump to Sims's conclusion, the administration  forecasts look 
different  from the past-indeed,  precisely what the administration  has 
been arguing  all along. Sims cleverly formalizes  this notion by asking 
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Presumably  by studying  the  pattern  of shocks  one can  determine  whether 
they might  plausibly  arise from a rule change of the sort that President 
Reagan  has proposed. 
A few questions can be raised about the specific example in this 
section. 
First, one does not get a good feel, unfortunately,  for the differences 
in  forecast  variance  introduced  by the drifting  parameter  estimates.  How 
robust is Sims's finding of little drift? Are the shifts in the "policy" 
equation  any bigger than in the rest of the model, for example? How 
confident  can one be that  there  has not been a change  in the rate  of drift? 
Second, Sims's method  of detecting  drift  may  indicate  little change  in 
coefficients  over time even when major  policy changes have occurred, 
if those changes  are  not well characterized  by a random  drift  of the policy 
coefficients. Suppose that the policy rule alternated  regularly  between 
Democratic  and Republican  administrations.  The random  walk model 
might  best be summarized  by low drift  even if  policy is regularly  bouncing 
between two poles. The "errors"  from  the policy equation  estimated  in 
this case would display strong serial correlation.  It is conceivable that 
agents'  behavior  might  change  according  to the administration  in power. 
Finally, the shifts in coefficients are by design uncorrelated  with the 
relevant  economic  time  series, and  with  each other.  There  is no feedback 
from economic outcomes to policy, or from policy to structure.  There 
are extremely strong assumptions that may reduce the evidence of 
structural  drift  or its importance.  The Lucas critique  holds that drift  in 
the policy equations should be correlated  with drift elsewhere in the 
model. Sims might  offer some evidence on this point. 
General Discussion 
Many  discussants  agreed  with Sims's criticism  of the Lucas critique. 
James Duesenberry suggested that the domain in which the critique 
applies is quite limited. First, only a fraction of policy developments 
could  be interpreted  as changes  that, even theoretically,  should  actually 
cause parameters  in the model to vary. Furthermore,  there are many 
economic relations  in which expectations  about macroeconomic  policy 
variables  are simply not that important.  To someone selling  hot dogs at 
a ball game, it might be worth a couple of bucks to buy a weather 
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situation  characterizes  most individual  equations in large models. Fi- 
nally, even when expectations  about  prices or output  may be important 
to consumption or investment decisions, those expectations are far 
removed  from  forecasts  of the money supply.  Charles  Holt made  several 
related  points in the spirit  of Sims's paper.  He noted that  policy actions 
contain a great deal of randomness, like treatments assigned in an 
agricultural  experiment,  and that this randomness  should  help in deter- 
mining  the rest of the structure. He also argued  that policy rules are 
mainly  economists' abstractions  of a complicated  reality and are quite 
foreign  to economic agents. If policy rules are obscure, so are changes 
in them; the impact of changes on expectational  relations  must conse- 
quently  be very slight. 
Lawrence Klein disagreed  with the rational  expectations view that 
the parameters  in structural  equations would be altered as a result of 
policy  changes.  Even if people's  method  of forming  expectations  changed, 
the primary  implication  is that expectations variables  would have to be 
adjusted,  not that  the other  parameters  of the system  would  vary. Stanley 
Fischer disagreed with Klein. In Fischer's view, some parameters  in 
many macro models vary with policy changes. He argued that this 
requires  more complicated  structural  equations  in which the effects of 
policy rules on agents' behavior  are allowed  for explicitly. 
Some of the discussants  commented  on Sims's analysis  of macroeco- 
nomic modeling  and identification.  One point emphasized  in his paper 
is that  there are rarely  abrupt  or complete changes in policy rules. John 
Taylor  thought  this emphasis  was misplaced  with respect to the useful- 
ness of policy analysis. Economists still need to provide guidance to 
policymakers  about the effects of various policy rules and the mecha- 
nisms for changing  these rules. It is possible to use statistical  methods 
that  focus on policy systems and their effects even if dramatic  changes 
have not occurred  in the past. Sims cautioned  that it would be difficult 
to apply such methods when observed policy movements  could simply 
represent  random  drift. 
Klein  disagreed  with Sims's emphasis  on optimal  control  exercises as 
a test of the adequacy of conventional structural  macro models. He 
argued  that when the models are actually used in policy applications, 
alternative  discrete  policies are explored  simply  to provide  guidance  for 
moving  in an advantageous  direction.  He also disputed  Sims's claim  that 
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in the early 1970s.  After some deterioration  in 1973-74,  the normalized 
errors  are no worse now than  they were before 1973.  Klein  also disputed 
the view that  vector autoregressions  are to be preferred  to conventional 
models  for simple forecasting. Referring  to work by Stephen McNees, 
Klein  maintained  that vector autoregressive  (VAR) models are all right 
for predictions  one quarter  ahead, but VAR predictions  quickly  deteri- 
orate so that conventional  models offer superior  predictions  further  in 
the future. Sims responded that if one reestimates the VAR models 
quarter  by quarter  and projects ahead two to six quarters, the VAR 
predictions  are approximately  as reliable  as conventional  forecasts. 
William  Poole questioned  whether  policy  regimes  are  as endogenously 
determined  as Sims's paper  suggests. Pointing  to the shift from  fixed to 
flexible  exchange  rates  in 1971,  Poole argued  that  if such regime  changes 
are endogenous, there is no chance in principle  of using data in nonex- 
perimental  science to draw conclusions about how the world works 
under  alternative  regimes. But Sims said  that  it is one point  of this paper 
to show that even endogenous policy shifts can have effects which, in 
theory, can be identified. 
There was spirited  discussion of Sims's estimates of the plausibility 
of the Reagan  administration's  economic forecast. George  von Fursten- 
berg  thought  those forecasts should  not be taken seriously  in the paper. 
According  to von Furstenberg,  they were dictated by political consid- 
erations  without  regard  for the likelihood  or internal  consistency of the 
predictions.  Charles  Schultze raised  a more  fundamental  objection. He 
doubted that Sims's VAR methodology could be applied to assessing 
the  plausibility  of the administration's  forecast. Sims  estimated  a system 
in which policy is endogenous-that is, determined  by previous values 
of variables  in the system and by random  error.  But policy may not be 
generated by the previous decision rule; the present administration 
would  certainly  contend  as much. Consequently,  the outcomes predict- 
able solely on the basis of the historical  record  might  not apply. Given 
that  the decision  rule  is now significantly  changed,  what  is the  probability 
that  the forecast  will turn  out to be accurate?  This question  is inherently 
unanswerable  using  the VAR  assumptions.  In  the  present  case, aforecast 
that  incorporates  the information  that  tax rates  have  in  fact  been radically 
changed  cannot  be evaluated  by a VAR approach  in which tax rates are 
themselves  implicitly  a forecast based on past tax rates. 